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UNSAFE HAWNS: THE CASE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FOSTER
CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT
Michael B. Mushlin*
Introduction
In a midwestern community not long ago, a one-year-old
girl who required constant medical attention for epileptic seizures was sent by a state child welfare department to a foster
home known by the state to be inadequate.' In fact, the caseworker assigned by the state to supervise the home had recommended that the department not use this "marginal" setting
except on a temporary, short-term basis. Children sent to this
home in the past had been "ill clothed" and had not received
attention for medical problems. The warning was ignored. When
the child's caseworker reported that the foster parents were not
bringing the child to her scheduled medical appointments, again
the child welfare department did not respond. Finally, after two
and one-half years and pressure from the child's physician, the
child was removed from the foster home. By this time, the child,
now three and one-half, had not received treatment for her
epilepsy and was also experiencing other medical problems.*
Even after an official finding of abuse by the state was registered
against the home for its failure to care for this child, the state

* Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1966, Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1970,
Northwestern University.
I am grateful for the thoughtful editorial assistance and encouragement of Professor
Donald L. Doernberg. I am also grateful for the assistance of Professors Norman B.
Lichtenstein, M. Stuart Madden, David Rudenstine, Barbara Salken and Menil Sobie.
I also wish to express my appreciation for the research assistance of Susan DeGeorge,
Talay Hafiz, Shelley Halber and Laura Hunvitz. Finally, I am thankful for the support
and encouragement of my wife, Thea Stone.
G.L. v. Zurnwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (cited in D. Caplovitz & L.
Genevie, Foster Children in Jackson County, Missouri: A Statistical Analysis of Files
Maintained by The Division of Family Services 86-87, case 5.2 (July 21, 1982) (unpublished report)).
The child was experiencing constant diarrhea and had not been toilet trained. In
addition, she was so emotionally deprived that, although she was three and one-half,
she had not been taught how to kiss. Id. at 87.
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continued to use the foster home without interruption as a placement for abused and neglected children.
In the same state, another foster child was assaulted while
in foster care. The state knew of the attack, but did nothing.
Within four months, the child was sexually abused by the foster
father in the same home.3 In a third foster home, a four-yearold girl was whipped by her foster mother and made to stand
with her hands extended over her head for thirty minutes. The
child was being punished for being dirty. Although the caseworker determined that the child had been beaten, and reported
this to her superiors, no action was taken and the child was
returned to the home.4
In another part of the country, a troubled young boy who
wet his bed was placed in a foster home. The foster mother,
frustratzd at her inability to control his behavior, sought help
from the state's child welfare agency. Her pleas were ignored.
The situation deteriorated until one night the foster mother
forced the child to "drink his ~ r i n e . " ~
None of these cases received public attention, nor were any
of them the subject of reported court decisions or large damage
awards. Each, however, is an example of the stark reality of
life in foster homes6 for too many of the nation's half-million7
Id. at 87, case 5.3.
Id. at 89, case 5.6.
5 Gil, Institutional Abuse of Children in Out-of-Home Care, 3 Child and Youth
Services 7, 10 (1981).
Foster family care is distinguished from institutional care and adoption in that
"the foster family care is designed to be temporary and to offer the child care in a
family setting." A. Kadushin, Child Welfare Services 425 (1967). In this Article, the
term "foster care" is used to refer to foster family care arrangements.
Once it is determined that a child can no longer remain in her original home, state
law usually places the child in the custody of the state or local department of chid
welfare. R. Horowitz & H. Davidson, Legal Rights of Children 358 (1984). The child
welfare agency normally selects and licenses adults to serve as foster parents. Id. at
361-65. The foster family then often enters into a contractual arrangement with the
agency that requires the foster parents to care for the child under the direction and
supervision of the agency. Id. A typical foster family is a middle-aged, working or lowermiddle class family that owns its own home and has agreed to undertake the responsibility of foster care parenting out of either a need for extra cash or an altruistic desire
to help needy children. Mnookin, Foster Care-Zn Whose Best Interest?, 43 Harv.
Educ. Rev. 599,610 (1973) [hereinafter Mnookin, In Whose Best Interest?]; A. Gruber,
Children in Foster Care: Destitute Neglected . . . Betrayed 151-74 (1978); T. Festinger,
No One Ever Asked Us . A Postscript to Foster Care 270-71 (1983).
7 For the years 1977 to 1983, estimates have varied from 273,913 to 502,000. T.
Tatara, Cltaracteristics of Children in Substitute and Adoptive Care: A Statistical Sum-

..
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foster children. This Article assesses constitutional rights of
foster children to protection. In the last twenty-five years, the
The
number of children in foster care has increased fi~efold.~
foster care program now ranks with prisons, mental institutions
and juvenile detention and treatment centers as a major stateoperated custodial p r ~ g r a m . ~
The Article argues that foster children have an equal, if not
greater, claim to federal judicial protection from harm while in
state care than do institutionalized persons who are already
accorded significant protection^.'^ Yet, in stark contrast to

mary of the VCIS National Child Welfnre Data Base 30, table 2 (1985). In 1983, the
latest year for which data are available, the American Public Welfare Association
estimated that 447,000 children were served by the nation's foster care system. Id. at
32, table 3. Of that number, sixty-nine and one-half percent were sent to foster family
homes. Id. at 62. The remainder resided in group homes or institutions. Id. See also F.
Kavaler & M. Swire, Foster-Child Health Care 1 (1983); Children's Defense Fund,
Children Without Homes: An Examination of Public Responsibility to Children in Outof-Home Care 2 (1978); Lowry, Derring-Do in the 1980's: Child Welfare Impact Litigation After the Warren Years, 20 Fam. L.Q. 255, 275 (1986).
Be~harov,Foster Care Reform: Two-Books for Practitioners (Book Review), 18
Fam. L.Q. 247 (1984) [hereinafter Besharov, Foster Care Reform]. Three major reasons
have been offered to explain the expansion in the use of foster care. R. Mnookin, In
the Interest of Children 69 (1985) (decrease in use-of institutions for abandoned and
neglected children) [hereinafter Mnookin, In the Interest]; Besharov, The Misuse of
Foster Care: When the Desire to Help Outruns the Ability to Improve Parental Functioning, 20 Fam. L.Q. 213,215 (1986) (increase in births to young single mothers unable
to raise their children) [hereinafter Besharov, The Misuse of Foster Care]; Besharov,
Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems, and Future Directions, 17 Fam.
L.Q. 151, 153-55 (1983) (increase in child abuse and neglect reporting systems) [hereinafter Besharov, Child Protection]. Almost eight times as many children are reported
to state officials as suspected victims of abuse or neglect than were reported in 1960.
Id. at 151. Still, it is likely many children who ought to be in substitute care are not,
either because their cases are not reported or because of the failure of the child welfare
system to respond to legitimate pleas for protection of endangered children. Id. at 161
(estimates 50,000 cases of observable injuries not reported in 1979).
It is also likely, however, that some children go into foster care unnecessarily.
Children's Defense Fund, supra note 7 at 15-18 (lack of family services). Mnookin, In
Whose Best Interest?, supra note 6 , at 619-20 (vagueness of statutes permits class,
race, and lifestyle biases to affect decisions).
See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 174, chart 307 (107th ed. 1987) (503,601 state and federal prisoners). Id.
at 171, chart 301 (223,551 held in jails). Id. at 100, chart 159 (220,700 mental health
inpatients). Id. at 171, chart 299 (51,402 juveniles in public custody, 34,112 in private
custody). Id. at 99, chart 158 (132,235 in-state facilities for the mentally retarded).
Other commentators have surveyed problems in foster care. Two articles offer
arguments for a foster child's right to safety. See Donella, Safe Foster Care: A Constitutional Mandate, 19 Fam. L.Q. 79 (1985); Comment, Child Abuse in Foster Homes:
A Rationale for Pursuing Causes of Actions [sic]Against the Placement Agency, 28 St.
Louis U.L.J. 975 (1984). Other articles have considered issues such as the standards
for placement, the right of foster children and foster parents to remain together, and
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scores of decrees entered to protect institutionalized persons
from physical harm, there is but one reported federal case" that
has enforced by injunctive decree a constitutional right of foster
children to protection from harm while in foster care.
The six sections of this Article present the case for direct
federal court involvement in aiding foster children who are at
risk of abuse and neglect while in foster care. Section I discusses
the extent of abuse and neglect in foster care as well as the
structural causes of this maltreatment. It also explains the inevitable failure of the political branches of government to confront the problem. Section I1 describes the constitutional right
to safety and surveys the judicial treatment of that right, including the lack of development of the right for children in foster
care. Section I11 discusses differences between children in foster
family care and institutionalized persons, and argues that none
of the differences can account for the failure to accord foster
children the benefits of the right to safety. Section IV explores
the appropriate remedy for the right to safety for foster children,
and it demonstrates that damage remedies are inadequate because their availability is severely circumscribed by a variety of
immunity doctrines, and because even if they were available,
monetary awards deflect attention from the root causes of abuse
and neglect of foster children. This section presents the case for
structural injunctions as the most practical remedy.
the entitlement of foster children to permanence through either a prompt return home
or adoption. See, e.g., Besharov, Tlze Misuse of Foster Care, supra note 8; Dobbs,
Foster Care atrd Farnily Larv: A Look at Smith V. OFFER and the Constitutional Rights
of Foster Clrildren and Their Families, 17 J. Fam. L. 1 (1979); Mnookin, In Whose Best
Interest?, supra note 6; Musewicz, Tlze Failure of Foster Care: Federal Statutory
Refortrr atrd tlre Clrild's Right to Permanence, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 633 (1981); Wald,
State Itrterventiotr orr Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children frotrr tlrcir Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termirratiorr of Paretrtal Rights, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1976).
1' G.L. v. Zumwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (consent decree). A case
is now pending in federal court that squarely presents the issue of whether or not foster
children are entitled to injunctive relief designed to vindicate their right to be protected
from harm. L.J. v. Massinga, Civ. No. 84-4403 @. Md. filed Dec. 1984). On July 27,
1987, a preliminary injunction was granted in that case. See infra note 169. The case
now awaits final trial and disposition. In addition, a class action raising the issue of the
constitutional right of foster children to safety is now pending before a state court. Janet
T. v. Morse, S-359-86 WNM (Sup. Ct. Vt. filed Aug. 29, 1986). Thus, it seems likely
that io the near future courts will be required to determine for the first time whether it
is appropriate to assert jurisdiction to fashion structural injunctive decrees for the
protection of foster children.
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Section V discusses whether federal courts are the appropriate forum to address the right to safety for foster children.
Until the 196OYs,federal courts declined to become involved in
cases involving custodial conditions because of a self-imposed
abstention policy called the "hands-off" doctrine.12 Under that
doctrine, courts deferred entirely to the judgments of administrators.I3 The awakening of interest in the rights of the confined
led to the erosion of that doctrine.14 In 1974, the Supreme Court
announced definitively that the hands-off doctrine was inconsistent with constitutional principles, saying that "there is no iron
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this
country."15 Since then, lower federal courts have almost routinely intervened on behalf of the institutionalized, at least when
necessary to protect against the most severe conditions of confinement.16 Section V concludes that federal courts should also
be the appropriate forum for foster care right-to-safety cases,
and argues that none of the judicially created abstention doctrines bar them.
The final section of the Article proposes five basic guidelines which, if followed, would maximize the potential effectiveness of district courts in making foster care safe. The Article
concludes that federal judicial involvement offers the promise
of benefitting children in foster care by materially improving a
system that thus far has resisted reform. Without judicial scrutiny, the abuse and neglect that many children suffered in their
l2 See Comment, Beyond the Ken of Courts: A Critique of Judicial Reficsal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L.J. 506 (1963). See also infra notes 112113 and accompanying text.
l3 Zeigler, Federal Court Reform of State Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine from a Modern Perspective, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 31,
56 (1985) (citing cases).
l4 See, e.g., A. Neier, Only Judgment: The Limits of Litigation in Social Change
170-71 (1982).
l5 W O E v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). Professor Zeigler dates the
demise of the hands-off doctrine a decade earlier, to Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546
(1964). See Zeigler, supra note 13.
l6 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), modified srrb nom.
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub nom. Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (prison); Morgan v. Sporat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss.
1977) (iuvenile detention facility); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (mental hospital);
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F.Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y.
1973) (institution for the mentally retarded); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016
(E.D.La. 1970) (prison).
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original homes will continue after the state places them in foster
care. For these children, the temporary, substitute family system imposed on children in foster care by the state will not be
a haven, but a hell.

I. The Problem of Abuse and Neglect in Foster Home
Placements
Foster care is intended to provide a temporary, safe haven
for children whose parents are unable to care for them." Too
often, however, this purpose is not realized. Frequently, foster
children are exposed to abuse and neglect by foster parents,
and to serious injury due to the failure of the system itself to
provide for stable care, or to attend to the children's medical
problems. The failure of foster care programs to follow appropriate minimum standards that would ensure the care and protection of children has led to increased rates of foster care abuse
and neglect. Despite the considerable costs, to both the children
affected and to society generally, the political process has been
unresponsive to calls for-reform of foster care iystems.

A. Types ofAbuse and Neglect
Whatever the reason for placement, foster children have
not had a normal upbringing. By definition, the bonds to a foster
child's permanent family have been disrupted. Foster children
suffer disproportionately from serious emotional, medical and
psychological disabilities.l8 To compound matters, it is wellestablished that they are at high risk of further maltreatment
while in foster care.lg Foster children, therefore, are especially
vulnerable individuals, prone to become victims unless special
17 Child Welfare League of America, Standards for Foster Family Services 8 (1975);
Musewicz, supra note 10, at 637.
l8 A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 182; D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 37,
table 2.3; P. Ryan, Analyzing Abuse in Family Foster Care: Final Report 59 (1987).
l 9 P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 59 and authorities cited therein; Vera Institute of
Justice, Foster Home Child Protection 31-32 (Feb. 1981) (unpublished report) (Children
who were abused in foster care were three times as likely to have entered foster care
because of parental abuse than children who were not abused); D. Caplovitz & L.
Genevie, supra note 1, at 100 (Children with several emotional, intellectual or physical
difficulties tended to be at higher risk of abuse or neglect).
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care is taken to protect them. Two broad categories of mistreatment of these children have been identified.
1. Foster Family Abuse and Neglect

No one knows how many children are abused or neglected
while in foster care,20but the problem is more widespread than
is currently acknowledged. Children in foster family care have
been reported severely beaten21 and killed.22In addition, cases
in which children have been subjected to bizarre p ~ n i s h m e n t s ~ ~
or parental neglect24are common.
Foster children seem peculiarly vulnerable to sexual abuse.
This is a special problem because, by definition, there is no
permanent kinship bond in foster care. As a result, the traditional incest taboo does not operate.25 The lack of permanent
tiesz6combined with the cultural and class gaps that often exist
between foster families and foster children, also can create an
explosive environment in which expressions of verbal hostility
often erupt.27
While foster care has been frequently criticized for other
reasons, some observers claim that, at the very least, children
20 Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 43. See also P. Ryan & E. McFadden,
National Foster Care Education Project: Preventing Abuse in Family Foster Care 11,
14 (1986).
21 Vera Institute of Justice. suora note 19. at 8-9 (use
of belts. switches, electric
.
cords, dog leashes, bread boards and broomsticks).
See Vonner v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973) (foster
child beaten to death); D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 94-95, case 5.14
(child killed by foster mother's boyfriend); Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at
v (foster child beaten to death by his foster mother).
a B. Warren & G. Bardwell, G.L. v. Zum~valt,Case Record Monitoring, April 11,
1983 through June 30, 1984: Final Report 52-54 (Apr. 24, 1985) (unpublished report on
file with author) (children forced to stand in the center of a room for up to thirteen and
one-half hours at a time, made to use a tin can for a toilet, locked in a basement, toilettrained by being forced to stand with their pants over their heads); D. Caplovitz & L.
Genevie, supra note 1, at 88, case 5.4.
a D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 64 (children received only two meals
a day and bitten by bedbugs); Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 13-14 (children
smelled of "urine and vomit" and were "continually hungry").
25 P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 60. An additional factor accounting for the higher level
of sexual abuse in foster care is that a large number of foster children were sexually
abused in the past. Id. at 105. See also B. Warren & G. Bardwell, supra note 23, at 5354, case 549.
26 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
B. Warren & G. Bardwell, supra note 23, at 54, 64, cases 549, 536, 660 (citing
cases in which foster parents have called their child a "dummy," said, "I feel sorry for
you," and talked negatively about the chid's mother).
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in foster care are protected from a high risk of abuse and neglect
of the type just described.28 The evidence, however, does not
bear out these hopes. One study reported that the rate of substantiated abuse and neglect in New York City foster family
care was more than one and one-half times that of children in
the general p o p ~ l a t i o n .A~ ~national survey of foster family
abuse and neglect, completed in 1986 by the National Foster
Care Education Project, revealed rates of abuse that, at their
highest, were over ten times greater for foster children than for
children in the general p o p ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~
As high as the reported rate is, a much higher level of abuse
and neglect actually occurs than that officially reported. In 1979,
a San Francisco group undertook a project to educate child
welfare officials in a six-county area to discover unreported
abuse occurring in foster care homes.31 Within a two-year period, seventy-five cases of either physical abuse and neglect or
See Mnookin, Itz Wlzose Best Interest?, supra note 6, at 632.
Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 63-64 (49 abused children per 1,000
in general population and 77 per 1,000 for children in foster family care).
30 The number of complaints ranged from 3 per 1,000 homes to 67 per 1,000 homes.
Substantiated abuse complaints ranged from 1.2 per 1,000 to 27 per 1,000. P. Ryan &
E. McFadden, supra note 20, at 11. According to the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, the rate of maltreatment of children in 1978 for those 34
states reporting on the subject was 2.55 per 1,000. Department of Health and Human
Services, National Analysis of Official Child Neglect and Abuse Reporting 10-11, Table
2 (1978).
Unfortunately, the reported statistics on foster family abuse studies are not widely
known. Comment, supra note 10, at 976 ("Statistics indicate that the percentage of
abused children who suffer at the hands of foster parents is 'miniscule,' a mere
0.3%.
.") (quoting Note, Tlte Cltallenge of Cltild Abuse Cases: A Practical Approach,
9 J . Legis. 127, 139 (1982)). The statistic that only .3 percent of all reported abuse cases
involve foster parents is not terribly illuminating for several reasons. First, it represents
only the raw number of substantiated abuse cases involving foster children, without
comparison to the number of foster parents generally. Therefore, it does not supply the
relationship between the number of foster parents and those who are abusive, a figure
that is relevant where, as here, one is interested in knowing the risk of abuse to any
given foster child. Obviously, the overwhelming majority of American children are not
cared for in foster homes.
Second, the percentage does not disclose how many foster children were abused
by foster parents. Since multiple placements are not rare, see infra note 38 and accompanying text, and since many foster homes are not closed despite reports of abuse and
neglect, see supra notes 1, 5 and 8 and accompanying text, it is reasonable to assume
that there is a greater than one-to-one relationship between abusing foster parents and
abused foster children.
Third, the report deals with only substantiated cases of foster parent abuse and
neglect. This statistic does not include children who are harmed by "program" abuse.
See it@ note 35 and accompanying text.
3' Gil, supra note 5, at 8.
'8

..
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sexual abuse were reported from the area. In the past, "virtually
no reports had been documented" through the official child
abuse reporting system.32 Another study found that one state
foster care agency neglected to report sixty-three percent of the
cases of suspected child maltreatment to the central registry of
child neglect, even though such reports were mandated by state
law.33
The actual amount of abuse and neglect may be much
greater than anyone imagines. One study attempted to account
for unreported or uninvestigated abuse and neglect in assessing
the risk of abuse and neglect in foster boarding home care. The
study concluded that forty-three percent of the children studied
had been placed in an unsuitable foster home, and that fiftyseven percent of the children in the foster care system who were
examined were at serious risk of harm while in foster care.34
2. Program Abuse

Another equally dangerous form of mistreatment results
when the foster care system itself fails to provide children with
a stable and secure home setting, or when it does not provide
for the child's medical, psychological and emotional needs. This
type of mistreatment has been termed "program abuse."35
a. Stability of Care

Children entering foster care placement inevitably experience the pain of separation from their family setting no matter
how inadequate that setting has been.36 The substitute experi3Z Id.

at 8-9.
D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 83-84, table 5.1. The study also
reported that in over forty percent of the cases, the agency did not so much as undertake
an internal investigation to determine whether or not the suspicion of abuse reported
by its own caseworker was true. Id. at 84-85. A follow-up study three years later
revealed that the same agency failed to report, for external investigation, seventy-four
percent of the suspected incidents of child mistreatment in the sample group. B. Warren
& G. BardweIl, supra note 23, at 50-51, chart 3.
D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 59-69,82-98. The study based these
calculations upon an examination of over 800 case records maintained for 194 randomly
selected foster children placed in care within a five year period prior to March of 1981.
Id. at 96.
35 G
i,supra note 5, at 10.
= Id.
33

"
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ence created in its place compounds that trauma if it does not
~~
foster
provide a stable home e n ~ i r o n m e n t .Unfortunately,
home placements are frequently extremely unstable. Often foster children are shuffled from home to home without any opportunity to form an attachment with an adult caretaker. Stays
in four or more foster homes are common.38 Aside from the
trauma entailed by this movement, the likelihood that the child
will be abused at some time during his stay increases with each

b. Medical Care
As the substitute parent, the child welfare program assumes
responsibility for the child's medical and psychological care.40
All children need medical care, but the need is acute for foster
children who are less healthy than any other identifiable group
of youngsters in the United States.41The provision of treatment
cannot await the end of a foster care placement.
Nevertheless, medical care systems for foster children are
inadequate "to manage effectively even simple and common
child health problems."42 For example, a comprehensive study
of the medical status of foster children found that many of the
pre-school age foster children studied had not received vaccinations for the prevention of childhood diseases.43 Fourteen
percent had received no medical examination upon admission
to foster care, and the average physical exam was i n ~ o m p l e t e . ~ ~
Forty-seven percent of the children had visual problems that
37 D. Fanshel & E. Shinn, Children in Foster Care: A Longitudinal Investigation
137 (1978).
J8 See D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 20-24; Children's Defense Fund,
supra note 7, at 41; A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 67-68.
39 See, e.g., Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at vi (reporting that twenty-

eight percent of victims of foster family abuse had been in three or more foster homes
as compared to only thirteen percent of foster children generally).
+
I Child Welfare League of America, supra note 17, at 5 3.10.
F. Kavaler & M. Swire, supra note 7. The authors undertook an extensive
independent evaluation of the physical condition of 668 New York City foster children.
See also A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 73 (Massachusetts); D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie,
, supra note 1, at 35-37 (Kansas City).
42 F. Kavaler & M. Swire, supra note 7, at 149.
Id. at 143. These findings have been confirmed. See, e.g., D. Caplovitz & L.
Genevie, supra note 1, at 41-43.
F. Kavaler & M. Swire, supra note 7, at 142.

"
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had not been evaluated by an optometri~t.~~
Over forty percent
needed dental care but had not been to a dentist.46Only onefourth of the children who had identifiable emotional or developmental problems had received treatment.47When children had
received medical attention, it often was inadequate. For example, sixty-one percent of the children who received glasses were
given inadequate prescription^.^^ Based upon these data the
aut!mrs concluded that "[tlhe system for providing health care
to foster children is woefully inadequate both in New York State
and in the country."49
In light of the high level of both foster family abuse and
neglect and program abuse, "[tlhe assumption that a child is
removed from an abusive or neglectful home and placed in a
safe environment can no longer be taken at face value. . . ."50
Indeed, the threat of abuse and neglect of children in foster
family care must be considered to be "acute and wide~pread."~'
Given the state's responsibility to these children, this situation
is inexcu~able.~~

B. The Causes and Costs of Maltreatment
Although all of the facets of abuse and neglect of foster
children have not been examined, enough is known to dispel
notions that foster care maltreatment is inevitable or that responsibility for maltreatment rests entirely with foster parents.
Instead, there is a growing body of evidence that links foster
family abuse and neglect to the state child welfare agencies that
fail to meet minimum professional standards.53Such standards
Id. at 146.
Id.
47 See also D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1, at 38; A. Gruber, supra note
6, at 89, 183.
" F. Kavaler & M. Swire, supra note 7, at 146.
49 Id. at 185. See also Shor, Health Care Supervision of Foster Children, LX Child
Welfare 313,318 (1981) (Maryland foster care agencies).
Gil, supra note 5, at 8.
51 P. Ryan & E. McFadden, supra note 20, at 14.
52 See also Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 64.
See Child Welfare League of America, supra note 17; American Public Welfare
Association, Standards for Foster Family Systems for Public Agencies (1975). See also
Cavara & Ogran, Protocol to Investigate Child Abuse in Foster Care, 7 Chid Abuse
and Neglect 287, 293 (1983); P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 7; Vera Institute of Justice,
supra note 19, at 33-34.
45

46

"
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require the careful screening and licensing of potential foster
care applicant^,^^ training of those who are chosen for the
careful matching of foster children with foster parents,s6 and
of
regular, continual supervision by competent caseworke~-s57
.~~
by trained caseworkers
the foster care p l a ~ e m e n tSupervision
fulfills two crucial functions. First, it allows the agency to meet
its "obligation to ascertain whether the child is receiving care
in accordance with accepted standards, and in relation to his
needs."59 Second, supervision promotes the competence of foster parents by relieving anxieties aroused by the child's behavior, increasing understanding of the child by supplying information and promptly providing supportive help. Training,
l
are often
casework support and consultation with s ~ c i aworkers
esential for foster parents to understand and guide foster children. Absent these forms of state back-up, foster parents can
find the behavior of foster children "baffling or inexplicable," or
may feel they are in an endless "struggle for control."60 Professional standards also provide for the elimination of foster home
54 See, e.g., American Public Welfare Association, supra note 53, at 55-56; Child
Welfare League of America, supra note 17, at § 4.16; Vera Institute of Justice, supra
note 19, at 33.
Foster children are not easy to handle, because often they have been sexually or
physically abused in the past. They present their caretakers with patterns of behavior
that are extremely upsetting and provocative to persons not prepared to cope with them.
Compliance with professionally recognized standards would require the availability of
training programs for foster parents. Child Welfare League of America, supra note 17,
at § 4.4. See also American Public Welfare Association, supra note 53, at 64; P. Ryan,
srtpra note 18, at 99-100, 105, recommendations 2, 15; Vera Institute of Justice, supra
note 19, at 33-36.
J6 The failure of a foster care agency seriously to consider prior to placement
whether a particular child should live with a particular set of foster parents is often the
direct cause of the maltreatment of foster children. Child Welfare League of America,
supra note 17, at 5 3.9. See also Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 36-37.
s7 See, e.g., American Public Welfare Association, supra note 53, at 64; Child
Welfare League of America, supra note 17, at § 4.4; P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 105-06,
recommendations 17-19; Vera Institute of Justice, Protection of Children in Foster
Family Care: A Guide for Social Workers (March 10, 1982) (unpublished article); P.
Ryan, supra note 18, at 3.
Child Welfare League of America, supra note 17, at 3 4.27. The Child Welfare
League standards require that the agency maintain personal contact with the child once
a month for the first year, after which personal contact every other month may be
sufficient. Id. at 3 4.28. Regular supervision is also stressed in the literature of foster
family abuse and neglect. See, e.g., American Public Welfare Association, supra note
53, at 65; P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 103, recommendation 11; Vera Institute of Justice,
srtpra note 19, at 39-42.
59 Child Welfare League of America, supra note 17, at 1 4.27.
60 P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 59-60.

J'
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over~rowding,~~
strict bans on improper p ~ n i s h m e n t ,and
~~
prompt referrals for outside investigation of all suspicions of
maltreatment by foster parents.63
Failure to follow professional standards results in increased
foster family abuse and neglect. One study connected the lack
of training of foster parents, foster home overcrowding, the
failure to match foster children with appropriate parents and the
failure t o visit foster homes regularly with the abuse of f s t e r
children.64Another study linked the failure to refer allegations
of abuse and neglect to the proper authorities for investigation
and the failure to follow up on suspicions of abuse with the
continuation of foster child abuse.'j5
These failures of the foster care system, and the corresponding abuse and neglect of foster children, have a serious,
detrimental effect on society. Injuries inflicted upon foster children will not heal easily since often the abused foster children
have already been harmed in their permanent homes.66Society
has a humanitarian interest in the prevention of such unnecessary suffering, and a strong utilitarian interest in reducing crime
and dependency. A negative foster care experience does little
to advance these interests; indeed, it contributes to later antisocial and dependent beha~ior.~'Then-Justice Rehnquist described the significance to society of protecting children from

Child Welfare League of America, supra note 17, at 8 4.7.
Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 57, at 17-20 (Condoning corporal punishment
raises the risk of severe injury to foster children. In addition, foster children are more
likely to interpret physical punishment as rejection which, in turn, reinforces their poor
self image.).
Gi,supra note 5, at 8. See also P. Ryan, supra note 18, at 107-08, recommendation 22.
Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 19, at 2.
Gil, supra note 5, at 9. See also Office of the City Council President, The Foster
Care Pyramid: Factors Associated with the Abuse and Neglect of Children in Foster
Boarding Homes 2, 53-55, 60-64, 69-73 (1982) (study found that inadequate home
studies, reference checks and procedures to decertify deficient foster homes correlated
with abuse and neglect).
66 Vera Institute of Justice, supra note 57, at 5-7 (citing J. Segal, Child Abuse: A
Review of Research Families Today 1 (1979)). See also Comment, supra note 10, at 979
(and authorities cited therein).
67 R. Flowers, Children and Criminality 101 (1986) (and authorities cited therein);
D. Gurak, Center for Policy Research, Foster Care Experience Among Incarcerated
Adults 19 (June 1977) (unpublished report). By contrast, there is evidence that foster
children who have had a satisfactory experience in foster care fare as well as children
in the general population. T. Festinger, supra note 6, at 199-209.
61
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abuse: "[Clhildren who are abused in their youth generally face
extraordinary problems developing into responsible productive
citizens. . . . Few could doubt that the most valuable resource
of a self-governing society is its population of children who will
one day become adults and themselves assume the responsibility
Nevertheless, the legislative and execuof self-g~vernance."~~
tive branches of government have not responded to calls for
foster care reform.

C . The Failure of Reform: Legislative and Executive Default
Although severe deficiencies in the foster care system have
been spotlighted almost from its start,69 the American foster
care system has developed a remarkable immunity to reform. It
has been the subject of studies at the state and national level,70
yet little appreciable improvement has resulted. In 1979, the
president of the Children's Defense Fund, Marian Wright Edelman, concluded that the conditions in the foster care system of
In the same
the United States remained a "national di~grace."~'
year, the National Commission on Children in Need of parent^,^^
issued its unanimous verdict that "[wlith some admirable exceptions, the foster care system in America is an unconscionable
failure, harming large numbers of the children it purports to
serve."73 While these condemnations concern the full gamut of
issues posed by the administration of foster care, the specific
issue of abuse and neglect of foster children in foster family
placements has not been o ~ e r l o o k e d . ~ ~
It is not difficult to understand why the American foster
care system has been so roundly criticized. Foster care systems
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 789-90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 9 (1930 White House conference marking
establishment of national foster care program); A. Kadushin, supra note 6, at 411 (citing
Lewis, Long-Time and Temporary Placement of Children in Selected Papers in Casework 40 (1951) (by the 1950's foster care was failing to fulfill its purpose)); H. Mass &
R. Engler, Jr., Children in Need of Parents (1959).
70 Children's Defense Fund, supra note 7; National Commission of Children in
Need Of Parents, Who Knows? Who Cares? Forgotten Children in Foster Care (1979);
A. Gruber, srrpra note 6 (Massachusetts foster care system).
7l Children's Defense Fund, supra note 7, at xiii.
n National Commission on Children in Need of Parents, supra note 70, at 4.
73 Id. at 5.
74 See supra notes 21-27, 29, 31-34, 64-65 and accompanying text. But see supra
notes 28,30 and accompanying text.
69
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are administered by staffs that are "overburdened, poorly paid
for the difficult work they
and often unprepared profe~sionally"~~
are called upon to perform. Lack of financial support has led to
a system that is poorly organized and usually lacks even the
most basic information about its own operation.76Foster parents
as well receive inadequate financial and professional support.
Payments offered to foster parents are often less than the cost
of caring for the basic needs of the child; inadequacy of these
payments adds financial stress to the burdens of being a foster
parent.77 Funding is especially important if foster care placements are to be made safe. Money is needed for additional
trained social workers to screen carefully and regularly supervise foster homes, to train foster parents and to ensure that an
adequate number of foster parents are available to avoid overloading foster homes with more children than they can handle.78
Funds must also be allocated to hire medical personnel to supervise and implement a decent medical care system.79Abuse
of children who come under the state's care for protection is
the "inevitable result of inadequate funding."80 Without additional aid, it would be almost impossible for change to occur
even if there were a commitment to it by people in the system.
One must ask why foster care is "least favored by the
legislat~re."~~
Here, too, the answer is not difficult to discern.
Foster care is a service almost always reserved for the children
of the poor,82and, in most states, foster care is disproportionately used by minority childrens3who, not unexpectedly, have
encountered discrimination in the foster care system.84The disNational Commission on Children in Need of Parents, supra note 70, at 6.
Lowry, supra note 7, at 257.
National Commission on Children in Need of Parents, supra note 70, at 21. See
also A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 172.
See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
Besharov, Protecting Children from Abuse: Should It Be a Legal Duty?, 11 U .
Dayton L. Rev. 509,546 (1986).
Lowry, supra note 7, at 274.
sz Mnookin, In Whose Best Interest?, supra note 6, at 607 and sources cited therein;
F. Kavaler & M. Swire, supra note 7, at 47. See Lowry, supra note 7, at 257.
83 National Commission on Children in Need of Parents, supra note 70, at 25.
Accord, Children's Defense Fund, supra note 7, at 49-52; Lowry, supra note 7, at 257;
Dobbs, supra note 10, at 4.
" See, e.g., Player v. Alabama Dep't of Pensions and Security, 400 F. Supp. 249,
255 (M.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding black children in the
75

76

Heinonline - - 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 213 1988

214

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 23

parate treatment of minorities also appears to mean that they
run an even greater risk of abuse and neglect in foster care than
other foster children.85 While other parents experiencing difficulties with child rearing can rely on private school and paid
professional support, the poor and the underclass must resort
to their local child welfare agency.
It is difficult to imagine a more powerless group of people
than foster children. They are largely unrepresented in the court
. ~ ~ without the
proceedings that lead to their p l a ~ e m e n t Living
protection of their parents, they are completely at the mercy of
the persons who may also be responsible for maltreating them.87
They do not vote; they lack the developmental ability to organize. Their voices, assuming they are old enough to speak,
cannot be heard. Whatever happens to them, therefore, happens
outside of the zone of public scrutiny.
The pressure that exists for improvements in foster care
systems focuses on issues other than maltreatment. Supporters
of foster care reform, responding either to the concerns of natural parents, or to those of foster parents concerned about
adoption, have concentrated on the states' over-reliance on foster care rather than on the issue of safety within the foster care
system. Natural parents and their advocates have exerted pressure for preventive services that would limit the need for foster
care by requiring the state to aid families in distress before
taking a child away.88 These services can include day care,
homemaker services, parent training, transportation, clinical
services and assistance in obtaining housing.89 Advocates of
Alabama foster care system were not given equal treatment in referrals to specialized
placements); Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (consent decree
designed to ensure that all children, regardless of race or religion, are served by the
New York City foster care system on a "first come-first served" basis). See also
Children's Defense Fund, supra note 7, at 49-54.
S5 D. Caplovitz & L. Genevie, supra note 1,at 99-100, table 5.5 (black children are
more likely to be abused or neglected in foster care).
See R. Horowitz & H. Davidson, supra note 6, at 296-99, $7.17, 368, $ 9.06
(Foster children usually have no voice in voluntary placements. There are minimal or
no procedural rights at periodic review proceedings.).
See supra note 6 and accompanying text, and infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
Wiltse, Current Issues and New Directions in Foster Care, in Child Welfare
Strategy in the Coming Years 67 (A. Kadushin ed. 1978); Stein, An Overview of Services
to Farr~iliesarld Clrildren in Foster Care, in Foster Children in the Courts 420 (M.
Hardin ed. 1983).
ss See, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, 8 423.2 (1987).

"
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adoption have called for "permanency planning" designed to
speed children though foster care by promptly returning them
to their original homes, or, if that is not practicable, by terminating parental rights and placing the child for adoption.g0
Yet even if these reforms are s u c ~ e s s f u "there
l ~ ~ will always be some children-the orphans, the abandoned, and the
severely abused-for whom substitute care outside of their
Cmliiisns for preventive services
homes will be necessa~y."~~
and permanency planning have not addressed the issue of maltreatment of foster children, perhaps because they would not
be the direct beneficiaries of such reform. Without an ally who
will materially or politically gain from the change, the plea for
protection of those children who will end up in foster care will
remain no more than a soft whisper. Whether the courts should
fill this void must now be considered.
D. The Call for Judicial Involvement

Courts would provide a great benefit to society were they
to become involved in foster care reform both by preventing
the indignity of abuse and by protecting foster children's fuMaluccio & Fein, Permanency Planning: A Redefinition, 62 Child Welfare 195,
197 (1983). The call for permanency planning from the legal and social work communities
has been loud and persistent. See, e.g., Christoff, Children in Limbo In Ohio: Permanency Planning and the State of the Law, 16 Cap. U.L. Rev. 1 (1986) and sources cited
therein; New York Task Force on Permanency Planning for Children in Foster Care,
Permanency Planning: A Shared Responsibility (March 1986); Mnookin, In Whose Best
Interest?, supra note 6, at 633-35.
91 Advocates who have called for child welfare reforms in the areas of preventive
services and permanency planning have begun to obtain at least some legislative results.
In 1980, Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Reform Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,94 Stat. 500 (provides financial incentives to encourage states
to strengthen preventive services and permanency planning). See 42 U.S.C. § 675. For
a comprehensive analysis of the provisions of the Act, see Allen, Golubock & Olson,
A Guide to The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Reform Act of 1980 in Foster
Children in the Courts 577 (M. Hardin ed. 1983).
Legislative reform focusing on the promotion of a permanent family bond has also
taken place at the state level. In 1976, California passed the Family Protection Act,
S.B. 30, 1977 Cal. Legis. Serv. 977 (West), and in 1979, New York passed the Child
Welfare Reform Act of 1979, 1979 N.Y. Laws 610, 611. See A. English, Foster Care
Reform, Strategies for Legal Services Advocates to Reduce the Need for Foster Care
and Improve the Foster Care System 83-97 (1981).
92 A. English, supra note 91, at 4.
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t ~ r e s Yet,
. ~ ~federal courts are understandably reluctant to become involvedg4in protracted endeavors, such as would be
required in large scale institutional reform of this kind, unless
they perceive that the need to do so is great. Some have argued
that federal courts should not intervene in such matters unless
intervention is necessary to protect the rights of "discrete and
insular" minoritiesg5who lack access to the normal political
process.96As one commentator put it: "The judicial obligation
to enforce the rights of the politically powerless is at the heart
of the American political system."97 Expressed differently, federal judicial intervention is appropriate when important constitutional rights are implicated, when the institution itself has
proven resistant to change through more traditional legislative
or executive means, and where the change requested is "critical
to the quality of American life."98 The case for the exercise of
judicial discretion to ensure protection of foster children is compelling under any of these formulations.
As discussed below, the right to protection occupies a critical niche in our system of government; it has historic roots in
our philosophical conception of the fundamental role and justification for government's existence.99If any group in society is
denied the right to protection, it is difficult to imagine how it
can enjoy any other right. Yet, foster children are powerless to
obtain the right for themselves.100Involvement by the federal
93 T. Festinger, supra note 6, at 262-64. See also Besharov, The Misuse of Foster
Care, supra note 8, at 218-19, (quoting M. Wald, Protecting Abuserneglected Children:
A Comparison of Home and Foster Care Placement 12-13 (1985)).
The power of a federal court to grant affirmative relief is discretionary. Comment,
Cotlfrontit~gthe Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in Prison
Reform, 12 Haw. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 367, 385-86 (1977); Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978). See generally D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 108-11 (1973).
93 The term "discrete and insular minorities" was first used by Chief Justice Stone
in his now famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938), to describe those groups that most require judicial protection in order to
enjoy their constitutional rights. See also J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 73-179 (1980);
Cover, The Origins
- of Judicial Activism in the Protection o f Minorities. 91 Yale L.J.
1287 (i982).
% See J . Ely, supra note 95, at 135-36; R. Mnookin, In The Interest, supra note 8,
at 37-41; Swygert, It1 Defense of Judicial Activism, 16 Val. U.L. Rev. 439,443 (1982).
97 Comment, supra note 94, at 386.
95 Zeigler, supra note 13, at 39.
99 See infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the historic
roots of the right to safety.
Professor Mnookin has observed that children as a group may not qualify for
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courts in advancing the right to protection is thus consistent
with the notion of the limited intervention of the federal
judiciary.
An additional motivation justifying judicial involvement in
foster care reform is the long history of solicitude to the needs
of children. Children, because of their obvious dependency,
need special protection.lo1As long ago as 1944,1°2the Supreme
Court recognized the state's strong interest in safeguarding children from abuse.lo3This interest is reflected in a virtually unbroken line of Supreme Court opinions upholding state actions
that might otherwise have been unconstitutional, but that were
saved by the need to protect children.lW
Having examined the nature and scope of the problem, the
foster care system's resistance to change through the legislature
or the executive, and the consistency of judicial involvement in
foster care reform with principles of judicial intervention, the
next section examines which substantive rights justify judicial
involvement.

11. The Constitutional Right to Safety
In 1982, a unanimous court in Youngberg v. Romeo held
that the state owes an "unquestioned duty" to provide reasonable safety for all residents of a state institution for the mentally
special protection as a discrete and insular minority because of the "multitude of
potential and part-time spokesmen [sic] for children." Mnookin, In The Interest, supra
note 8, at 41. Whatever may be said of children generally, however, foster children are
a discrete and insular minority, especially where a claim for which they have no obvious
allies is concerned.
Mnookin, In the Interest, supra note 8, at 31.
lrn
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
'03 I d . at 168-69 (upholding
. - law that prohibited children from selling magazines in
a public place).
lar New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding New York law prohibiting
knowing promotion of sexual performance b y childien even if it is not obscene); H.L.
v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding notification and consultation baniers to
the exercise of the right to an abortion for an immature minor which would be unconstitutional if applied to an adult); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, reh'g denied,
391 U.S. 971 (1968) (upholding criminal statute prohibiting sale to minors of material
that would not be obscene if sold to adults).
Taken together, these decisions establish a right unique to children to be protected
from "endangering surroundings and influences." S. Davis & M. Schwartz, Children's
Rights and the Law 73 (1987).
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retarded.lo5 Unquestioned though the right may be, recognition
of its existence developed quite slowly and it continues to lack
clear standards defining its scope. Nevertheless, the right to
safety has deep roots in American legal and philosophical
thought. This section briefly traces the origin of the right, its
development in lower federal courts and in the Supreme Court,
and provides a brief comment on the standards that courts have
used to determine whether or not the right has been violated,
and concludes with a discussion of the application of the right
to foster children.
A. The Development of the Right to Safety
1. The Origin of the Right

The right to safety for the institutionalized invoked by Justice Powell in Youngberg can be traced as far back as Blackstone, Cooke and Hobbes-progenitors of modern American
law-all of whom recognized that the first function of government is protection of the governed. In Leviathan, Hobbes' seminal seventeenth century work, Hobbes asserted that government's primary purpose and responsibility is protection. This is
so, he wrote, because men live under governments for their own
preservation.lo6In Calvin's Case,Io7Cooke, Chief Justice of the
King's Bench, explained the basic terms of the modern social
compact: in exchange for "true and faithful ligeance" the gov~ ~ Blackstone
ernment undertakes the duty of p r o t e c t i ~ n . 'And
ranked the "right to personal security" as the primary right each
citizen possesses.10gThe right to personal security "consists in
. . . uninterrupted enjoyment of . . . life . . . limbs . . . body
. . health, and . . . reputation."l1°

.

Io5 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982). While there were two concurrences in addition to the
majority opinion in Yolingberg, the Court did not divide on this issue. See infia text
accompanying note 145.
'06 T. Hobbes, Leviathan (1651).
Io7 [I6081 4 Co. Rep. 1 (K.B.).
Io3 Id. at 4b.
1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 129.
l t O Id. at 300. This conception of the centrality of the right of protection has not
changed in modern times. In 1918, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes authored an article
identifying four conditions that make up the "necessary elements in any society." O.W.
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2. The Early Prison Cases
Despite its deep jurisprudential underpinnings, the right to
safety has been recognized only recently as an enforceable constitutional right of the institutionalized. Although the Sixth Circuit suggested that the government had a duty to protect prisoners from assault or injury,"' as late as 1944, the hands-off
doctrine effectively precluded Etigation to enforce this right.li2
The hands-off doctrine was a judicially created concept that
commanded federal courts to abstain from examining prison
matters,l13 as prisons were considered the exclusive domain of
the Congress and of the state governments.l14
By the late 1960's and early 1 9 7 0 ' ~however,
~
federal courts,
responding to the Supreme Court's receptive approach to civil
rights cases, slowly began to lower the barrier to judicial review
of institutional conditions. During that time period, several
courts held that inmates have an eighth amendment right to be
protected from harm.u5 The eighth amendment's "evolving stanHolmes, Natural Law, in Collected Legal Papers 310, 312 (1920). The most important
of these, in Holmes' view, was "some protection for the person." Id. In Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Justice White stated that "[tlhe most basic function of
any government is to provide for the security of the individual and of his property." Id.
at 539 (White, J., dissenting). In a report to the American Bar Association in 1981,
Chief Justice Warren Burger identified "protection and security" as a "theme [that] runs
throughout all history." W. Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association 2
(Feb. 8, 1981) reprinted in 67 A.B.A. J. 290 (1981). For a thorough account of the
historic underpinnings of the right to safety and its roots, see Willing, Protection by
Law Enforcement: The Emerging
35 Rutgers
L. Rev. 1, 22-54
- - Constitutional Right,
(1982).
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
11* The hands-off doctrine was invoked even where inmates' safety was at stake.
Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285, 287,290 @. Alaska 1951) (The complaint alleged
that the facility was overcrowded and unsanitary, and that given the locked exits, a coal
stove presented an inescapable situation in the event of a fire. The court considered
conditions a "fabulous obscenity" but dismissed the complaint.).
Two recent cases dealing with the right to safety in penal facilities may foreshadow
a return to considering such complaints non-justiciable. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), discussed infra note 153.
Comment, supra note 10, at 507. The pull of the doctrine was so strong that
even claims of racial discrimination were not cognizable. See United States ex rel.
Monis v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1953). See also Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 985 (1962).
114 See. e z . . Banning v. Looney,
- . 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 19541, cert. denied, 348
U.S. 859 (i954..
See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (use of a strap to beat
prisoners as a disciplinary measure violated the eighth amendment's proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment). See also Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.

-
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dards of decency" were violated when prison officials failed to
manage their system in a way which minimized the high risk of
violence in the prison. The standards for application under the
eighth amendment varied: some courts based relief from unsafe
prison conditions on a visceral "shocking to the conscience"
test;u6 others based their interpretations on the observation that
the state must exercise ordinary .care in the custody of
prisoners. '17
In 1974, Justice White sounded the Supreme Court's death
knell to the "hands-off" doctrine in a single line: "[Tlhere is no
Iron Curtain between the Constitution and the prisons of this
c o ~ n t r y . "With
~ ~ the demise of the "hands-off" doctrine, lower
courts were free to consider right-to-safety cases without jurisdictional hindrance. As time passed, lower courts established
that the right to safety followed an inmate into prison. Those
decisions explain that the right protects inmates not only from
deliberate abuse by their keepers, but also from conditions
which make inmates open to violence by their fellow inmates.ug
1970), Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889,890 (4th Cir. 1973) (standards for adjudicating
the right to safety in a prison context: "(1) whether there is a pervasive risk of harm to
inmates from other prisoners, and, if so, (2) whether the officials are exercising reasonable care to prevent prisoners from intentionally harming others or from creating an
unreasonable risk of harm.").
I f 6Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1975); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362,380 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
!I7Muniz v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 542, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). This theory is
derived from common law doctrine that places a duty upon prison officials to provide
for the protection of prisoners who are placed in their charge. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts 9 20 (1965); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts 1048 (5th ed. 1984). In Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Court similarly found that prison authorities have a
constitutional duty to provide prisoners with medical care: "[Dleliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain."' Id. at 104, (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Several
lower federal courts have utilized this theory as a basis for affording prisoners relief
from rampant prison violence. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1122 (M.D.
Tenn. 1982).
!I8\%Iff V. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1973).
!I9See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,1250 (9th Cir. 1982); Little v. Walker,
552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
Extensive relief has been granted, effectuating that right. Among the types of relief
ordered are (a) increases in staff, see, e.g., Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.
1981); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), a r d in part and rev'd in
part, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir.
1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982); (b) improvements
to staff training programs, see, e.g., Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1128 (M.D.
Tenn. 1982); and (c) classification of inmates by dangerousness, see, e.g., Jones v.
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3. The Right in Other Institutional Settings

While the right to safety was fist articulated in the context
of prisons, and has been most fully developed there, it has been
implemented in other institutional settings as well. In 1973, a
federal district court held that a class of residents of the Willowbrook State School for the Me11taliy Retarded had the right "to
reasonable protection from harm."120 The court distinguished
this right to safety from a right to treatment, which it declined
to recognize. Courts since have followed the Willowbrook decision, applying it in other institutionalized settings as well. It
is now firmly established that the mentally ill and retarded,121
residents of state juvenile training
suspects in police
and pretrial detainees124have a constitutional right to
protection.
Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir. 1981); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052,
1060 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
In some cases, in order to ensure the right to protection, courts have ordered
modifications to the structure of an institution or, if necessary, that the institution, or
some part of it, be closed. See, e-g., Dimarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1978);
Martino v. Carey, 563 F. Supp. 984 @. Or. 1983) (court ordered progress reports on
renovations and their impact on violative conditions); Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F.
Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
See also Robertson, Surviving Incarceration: Constitutional Protection from Znmate Violence, 35 Drake L. Rev. 101 (1985-86); Plotkin, Serving Justice: Prisoners'
Rights to be Free From Physical Assault, 23 Clev. St. L. Rev. 387 (1974); Note, Inmate
Assaults and Section I983 Damage Claims, 54 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 596 (1977).
I2O New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). See New York Association for Retarded Children v.
Carey, 393 F.Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (consent decree encompassing protection from
harm caused by physical injury as well as from conditions causing the deterioration, or
preventing the development, of an individual's capacities), modification denied, 551 F.
Supp. 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), a r d in part and rev'd in part, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
See also D. Rothman & S. Rothman, The Willowbrook Wars (1984).
I2l See, e.g., Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239
(2d Cir. 1984); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473 @.N.D.
1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 @. Minn.
4th Div. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
19771~
- - ..,In Santana'v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966 (D.P.R. 1982), modified, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984); Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth,
419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 708 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1983); Martarella v.
Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239,245 (1983).
Iz4 Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364
(5th Cir. 1981).
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As in prison cases, the right is most frequently implemented
by courts in class action suits seeking injunctive relief, rather
than in individual suits for damages where the plaintiff's claim
often founders on one or more of the various immunity doct r i n e ~ .The
' ~ ~ injunctive relief that has been granted has provided
significant reforms in several institutional contexts. Courts have
ordered institutions for the mentally retarded or ill to make
decrease their population,127 hire
structural irnpr~vements,'~~
and provide
more staff,128institute staff training pr~gramsl*~
training of residents.I3O In pretrial detention decisions, courts
have been willing to close jails where deemed necessary to
ensure safety.I3'
Since the eighth amendment does not apply outside the
context of prison,'32 courts have relied on different theories to
support the right to safety for those in non-penal institutions.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is most
frequently invoked. For confinement to meet constitutional stanIU See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (The Court rejected the
previous standard which permitted a finding of liability based on proof that the official
acted in bad faith. Instead, the Court held that the individual must prove that her clearly
established constitutional right was violated by the defendant). Given the uncertainty
as to the standard governing the right to safety, see infra notes 149-153 and accompanying text, this is a difficult burden indeed. Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121, 1124 (1st
Cir. 1976). BIII see Gann v. Schramm, 606 F. Supp. 1442 @. Del. 1985) (official immunity
denied where officials at state mental hospital violated the well-known constitutional
right to a safe environment for those involuntarily committed to mental institutions).
Iz6 Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 132 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (physical improvements
in the facility to provide an appropriate environment for the mentally retarded).
Iz7 Woe v. Cuomo, 638 F. Supp. 1506, 1517 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (enjoining additional
patients from being admitted to the Bronx Psychiatric Center); New York State Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715,717 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (requiring sharp
reduction in the population of Willowbrook to a capacity of 250 beds or less).
Iz8 See, e.g., New York State Association For Retarded Children v. Rockefeller
357 F. Supp. 752, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
Iz9 Id. at 768 (consent decree increased stafling and training provision). See also
Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 133-34 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
Iy0 In the Willowbrook case, the consent decree mandated individually designed
instruction for residents. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 596
F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1979) (programs to include education, physical therapy, speech
pathology and audiology services). See also Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson,
561 F. Supp. 473, 494 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd,713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
I3l See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 689-90 @. Mass. 1973) (Charles
Street Jail deemed unfit by failing to meet a standard of "basic humanity toward men"
and ordered replaced).
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (the eighth amendment was "designed to protect those convicted of crimes").
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dards, the conditions of confinement must bear some relationship to its purpose.133If, as in the case of the mentally ill,
confinement is to treat and protect, the deprivation of liberty
lacks constitutional support when it fails to advance those
purposes. 134
4 . The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Right to Safety

Although the Supreme Court has not decided a prison case
in which it awarded relief which focused directly on the right to
safety,135it has endorsed lower court orders that provided affirl ~ ~Rhodes v.
mative relief on that ground. In Bell v. W ~ l J i s hand
the Court approved a number of lower federal
court opinions that granted relief from "deplorable" conditions
in some of the country's oldest and worst prisons and jails.138
Several of these lower court orders had implemented the right
to safety.139
Some states base the institutionalization on the parens patriae theory. Parens
patriae refers to the inherent power of a state to "provid[e] care to its citizens who are
unable . . . to care for themselves." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426 (1979). See,
e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487,496 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part and vacated
and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977) (The court cited approvingly the
language of the doctrine, but did not explicitly mention parens patriae). For a history
of the parens patriae theory, see Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae,
27 Emory L.J. 195 (1978); Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile
Court, 23 S.C.L. Rev. 205 (1971). The Supreme Court has imposed constitutional limits
on the doctrine by holding that when the state exercises this power it must take steps
to ensure that the exercise of the state's power bears some relationship to its purpose.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd on other
grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1980).
The Supreme Court has denied relief in two individual damage claims involving
the right to safety in prisons and jails. See infra note 153.
441 U.S. 520 (1978).
13' 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345 n.11, 346-47, 352 n.17.
The Rhodes majority cited with approval the following lower court decisions
that had granted relief which included implementation of the right to safety in prison:
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981);
Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th
Cir. 1974); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D.Ala. 1976), aff'd as modified, 559
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part on other grounds, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam).
In Bell, the majority, without specification, approved of lower court decisions which
"have condemned . sordid aspects of our prison systems." 441 U.S. at 562. See also
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681
(1978); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970).

..
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In 1982 the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the right
to safety in the context of institutionalized mentally retarded
persons. Youngberg v. Romeo140 was a damage action brought
on behalf of a thirty-three-year-old retarded man with the mental
capacity of an eighteen-month-old child. Romeo, confined involuntarily to the Pennhurst State Hospital, was "injured on
numerous occasions, both by his own violence and by the reactions of other [inmates] to him."141 Romeo's mother brought
suit on his behalf against Pennhurst's director and two supervisors, alleging at least sixty-three incidents of violence against
him. In an amended complaint, Romeo sought compensation for
the failure to be protected and provided "treatment or programs
for his mental retardati~n."'~~
Following a jury verdict for the defendants, Romeo appealed to the Third Circuit, complaining that the trial court's
charge defined his rights as stemming only from the eighth
amendment. The trial court, drawing on the Supreme Court's
eighth amendment cases, had charged that liability would not
attach for Romeo's injuries unless the defendants had been
"deliberately indifferent" to his needs.143The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Romeo's right to safety was found in the
fourteenth amendment, not the eighth, and that only "substantial
necessity" could justify abridging it. The court also held that
the right was broad enough to encompass Romeo's claim for
treatment.
Although the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
decision by the Third Circuit, the majority nevertheless held
that the right to safety for the institutionalized was an "unquestioned duty" of the state and was one of the "essentials of care
that the state must provide."145 Justice Powell observed:
"[Wlhen a person is institutionalized-and wholly dependent on
the state . . . [there is] a duty to provide certain services."146
The majority included the right to safety within the "historic

457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Id. at 310.
1421d.
at311. '
Id. at 312 n.11 (citing Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 155, 160, 169 (3d Cir.
1980)).
144 644 F.2d 147, 156, 160, 164.
457 U.S. at 324.
Id. at 317.
I4O
l4'
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liberty interests" essential to ensure a person's bodily integrity
from unnecessary invasion by the state, thus qualifying the right
to safety for substantive protection under the due process
~ 1 a u s e .The
I ~ ~right survives involuntary commitment, and since
the mentally retarded, unlike convicts, have not been guilty of
any wrongdoing, the Court intimated that their rights may be
even greater than those of prisoners.148
While the Court had little difficulty identifying the right to
safety as a substantive due process entitlement of the involuntarily confined, it struggled to articulate a clear standard for
determining when the right had been violated. The Court rejected the "deliberate indifference" standard used in prison
right-to-safety cases and by the district court in Yo~ngberg.'~~
On the other hand, the Court rejected the Third Circuit's "substantial necessity" test as well.Is0 It is not entirely clear what
test the Court adopted in its place. Justice Powell stated that
courts should balance "the liberty [interest] of the individual"
in safety against "the demands of an organized society."lS1Restrictions on liberty that are "reasonably related to legitimate
government objectives" are not unconstitutional even if they
result in a "lack of absolute safety."152Just what "relevant state
interests" Justice Powell had in mind for this balance are not
readily apparent from his opinion.153Despite the uncertainty
Id. at 315-16.
Id. at 321-22.
149 457 U.S. at 321-22.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 319-20.
IS3 The Court postulated that the denial of training might violate Romeo's right to
safety if training were necessary to relieve his aggressive behaviors. The standard the
Court used to make the determination of the amount of training required is whatever
"an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety." Id. at
324. The Court thus attached a "presumption of correctness" to the judgment of the
"qualified" persons in charge of Romeo's care.
It is by no means clear how such a standard applies in a typical class action rightto-safety case that arises from a lack of proper supervision, staff, or training, or from
the failure to classify individuals by dangerousness or to erect more structures for safe
confinement. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. These conditions occur
because of a lack of funds to operate an adequate facility and a generalized lack of
concern for the welfare of the inmates. Since such conditions normally are not the
product of distinct professional judgments concerning the treatment to be given a specific
individual, it is not easy to determine from the Court's opinion the standard a court
should apply in a typical right-to-safety case.
In two recent decisions, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), and Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986), the Court held that negligent failure to protect an inmate
la
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about the appropriate standard, the Court's opinion leaves little
doubt that a constitutional right to safety is included in the
notion of substantive due process, which is applicable not only
to prisoners but also to retarded persons who depend upon the
state for the necessities of life, and who are, supposedly, confined for their own welfare. Is there any inherent reason for this
right to be limited to those dependent on the state by reason of
their institutionalization? The next subsection briefly explores
that question.

5. The Development of the Right to Safety Beyond
Institutional Walls
Inspired perhaps by Youngberg, the lower federal courts
have recently expanded the boundaries of the right to safety
beyond institutional walls. In Jensen v. Conrad,lS4for example,
the Fourth Circuit, in dicta, noted that the state owes a constitutional duty to protect a child who had been reported to state
child protection workers as abused. There arose a duty to take
steps to prevent further harm from occurring, the court held,
from the moment the state became aware of the child's plight.'55
The Seventh Circuit has also recognized this right to
safety.Is6 That court had held that the Constitution protects
persons who, while not in state custody, are nevertheless placed
by the state in a position of danger and then left defenseless.
When the state, by its actions, throws a person in such a "snakepit," the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process is
triggered.157 White v. R o c h f ~ r dis~ ~a ~classic example of this
idea. On a cold day the Chicago police stopped a car driven by
a man transporting his two young nephews and cousin. The
uncle was arrested and taken by police escort to the station for
processing, but the car and the children were left on the shoulder

from harm while incarcerated does not violate the due process clause. Curiously, neither
the Daniels nor Davidson majority cited or addressed Youngberg.
1% 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984).
,, cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
lss
747 F.2d at 194.
Is6 Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d
381 (7th Cir. 1979).
IJ7
Bo~vers.686 F.2d at 618.
158 592 ~ . 2 d
381 (7th Cir. 1979).
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of a busy eight-lane expressway despite the uncle's pleas. After
exposure to the cold, the children decided to flee. Luckily, they
escaped with their lives. The two older children were traumatized, but not physically injured. The five-year-old, an asthmatic, was hospitalized for one week following the incident.
The children sued, seeking damages for their emotional and
physical injuries. The Seventh Circuit held that these facts, if
true, violated the right to safety even though the children were
not in state custody: "[Leaving] heipless minor children subject
to inclement weather and great physical damage without apparent justification . . . [is] a patently clear intrusion upon personal
integrity.'7159From the opinions it is not unreasonable to expect
that the Supreme Court would recognize some constitutional
right to safety for those not in state custody, but the question
is not free from doubt and it is by no means clear what the
parameters of that right would be.160
B. The Lack of Development of the Right to Safety in the
Foster Care Field

Although the right to safety is well-established for other
persons in state custody such as prisoners, mentally ill and
retarded persons, foster children have not yet received much
benefit from the right. G.L. v. Z ~ m w a l t 'is~ the
~ only case in
which final relief was provided to a class of foster children
predicated on a constitutional right-to-safety theory,162and that
case has limited precedential value because it was a consent

Id. at 384.
Several recent Circuit Court decisions further complicate this question. Compare
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987)
(reckless failure by welfare authorities to protect a child from a parent's physical abuse
did not violate the Constitution) and Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714 (1st
Cir. 1986) (no liability imposed on state for murder committed by inmate furloughed
from the House of Corrections who independently conceived of and executed the
murder) and Bradberry v. Pinellas County, 789 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1986) (swimmer
suffered no constitutional deprivation due to insufficient numbers of lifeguards or inadequately trained lifeguards) with Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 185 (7th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1265 (1986) ("When a municipality puts an individual
in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect that individual, it
cannot be heard to say that its role was merely a passive one.").
564 F. Supp. 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
la See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
159
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decree issued prior to trial.163There is only one case in which
damages were awarded to a foster child based on the right to
safety.164In addition, there are no reported decisions granting
final injunctive relief to protect foster children from abuse and
neglect in foster home placements. The limited case law suggests
a judicial reluctance to accept the notion that foster children
should be beneficiaries of this right.
Taylor v. LedbetteF5 illustrates this trend. On behalf of a
two-year-old girl, plaintiff sued the Gwinnett County, Georgia
Department of Family and Children's Services for severe injuries that occurred while the child was in foster care. Plaintiff
alleged that the child had been beaten by her foster mother and
then given an overdose of unnecessary medication which caused
her to become permanently comatose. The suit claimed that
defendants had violated the child's constitutional right to safety
by failing to investigate adequately the foster home before placing the child, by failing to supervise the foster home, and by
failing to provide complete medical information to the child's
physicians.
The original panel in Taylor affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The court characterized plaintiff's arguments as "reflect[ingJ a misunderstanding of the role of federal
Although the injuries to the child were obviously
"serious," the court expressed its belief that "[flederal courts
should exercise great caution in becoming involved in the decisions of state and local officials charged with the custody and
welfare of chi1dren."l6* Thus, the court articulated what
163 Generally, a consent judgment is binding only on the parties to the action. Green
v. International Business Mach. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 3d 124,345 N.E.2d 807 (1976). The
Supreme Court, therefore, recently indicated that the provisions of a decree, even in a
civil rights case, need not be fashioned strictly in accordance with governing law. Local
93, International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063,3077 (1986).
See also Comment, Local Number 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City
of Cleveland: A Consent Decree Is Not an Adjudicated Orderfor Purposes of Title VZI,
20 Akron L. Rev. 547 (1987).
la See supra note 11 and infra notes 175-180 and accompanying text.
165 791 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd on rehearing, 818 F.2d 791
(1 lth Cir. 1987) (en banc).
166 791 F.2d at 882.
Id. at 883,
"1 Id. at 884. The opinion made no mention of Youngberg. Indeed, it referred to
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amounted to another federal abstention doctrine. Although the
Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, recently reversed the panel
decision and held that the complaint should not have been dismissed, it left for further proceedings whether or not the child's
claim "constitutes a liberty interest protected by the due process
clause."169
Only in the Second Circuit has the right to safety been
squarely recognized and enforced in the foster care context. In
Brooks v. Richardson, the first reported case to discuss this
issue, a district judge in the Southern District of New York
refused to dismiss the pro se complaint of a mother who maintained that her child had been abused and neglected for over
five years while in foster care.170 The claim survived a motion
to dismiss because "[a] child who is in the custody of the state
and placed in foster care has a constitutional right to at least
humane custodial care."171 The court noted that the purpose of
foster care is to protect the child from harm in his permanent
the "deliberate indifference" standard which the Supreme Court in Youngberg specifically rejected as insufficient for persons not convicted of crime. 457 U.S. at 312 n.11.
In Atchley v. County of DuPage, 638 F. Supp. 1237 (N.D. IU. 1986), and Gibson v.
Merced County Dep't of Human Resources, 799 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1986), two other
right-to-safety claims were rejected. In Atchley, the claim was rejected because the
defendant was responsible for committing the child to foster care but did not have
responsibility to supervise the foster home in which the injury occurred. 638 F. Supp.
at 1240. In Gibson, the court assumed, without deciding, that a foster child has a
constitutionally protected right to be free from harm. 799 F.2d at 589. However, the
court found no denial of the right since the defendant's act of removing the child from
the home of the foster parents, without their consent, appeared reasonable.
Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). In addition to
the en banc opinion in Taylor, two recently decided cases granting preliminary relief to
foster children indicate that the pendulum may now be swinging in the direction of
recognition of the constitutional rights of children in foster care to safety. In Doe v.
New York City Dep't of Social Services, 86 Civ. 4011 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1987)
(granting motion for preliminary injunction), the court determined that the failure to
obtain foster home placements immediately for children taken into state custody and
the housing of these children overnight in social services offices violated plaintiffs'
constitutional rights. Slip op. at 101. In L.J. v. Massinga, No. JH-84-4409 @. Md. July
27, 1987) (granting motion for preliminary injunction), the court held that the plaintiffs,
children in the Baltimore foster care system, were likely to prevail on their claims that
they had a right to safety under Title IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act and the
fourteenth amendment. Slip op. at 27-30. Pending final determination, the court awarded
relief requiring the defendants to monitor foster homes, to provide appropriate medical
care to foster children, to refer complaints of mistreatment for investigation, and to
submit a plan to the court for the review of the continued licensing of any foster home
in which a child had been maltreated. Id. at 53-54.
Brooks v. Richardson, 478 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Id. at 795.
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home. Given this purpose, the court stressed that it would be
"ludicrous if the state, through its agents, could perpetrate the
same
that the placement in foster care was designed to
prevent.
It was not until the Second Circuit's decisions in Doe v.
New York City Department of Social Services173however, that
a court actually awarded damages in a disputed case involving
the right to safety. A foster child who had been beaten and
sexually abused by her foster father sued, claiming that her
plight had been or should have been known to the foster care
agency responsible for her care.174In Doe I, the circuit court
reversed a jury verdict for the defendants on the grounds that
the district court had incorrectly instructed the jury on the
plaintiff's constitutional rights.175In Doe 11,176the court again
reversed the trial court, this time for improperly setting aside a
$225,000 jury verdict.177Although it found for plaintiff, the Doe
court did not identify the source of the constitutional right it
invoked and it did not discuss the rationale for finding that the
right applied in a foster care setting in either of its two opinions.
The Court of Appeals referred to attributes of foster care that
it intimated might render the application of right-to-protection
concepts developed in the prison field unduly burdensomqto
foster care administrators. The court distinguished foster care
from other institutions on several grounds.
First, other institutions have "closer and firmer lines of
authority running from superiors [to] subordinates . . . than
Id, at 796.
649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cerf. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983) (Doe I ) and 709
F.2d 782, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 844 (1983) (Doe TI).
17' For a graphic description of the facts, see Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social
Services, 649 E2d 134, 137-40 (2d Cir, 1981), cerf. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
I75 The Doe I court held that the lower court "erroneously conveyed the impression
that deliberate indifference and negligence were mutually exclusive[,]" id. at 143, when
in reality, repeated acts of negligence could be perceived as "evidence of indifference."
Id, at 142. The Second Circuit also attached great significance to the defendants' failure
to comply with their statutory duty to report allegations of abuse for investigation. This
failure, the court held, could constitute deliberate indifference to plaintiff's welfare. Id.
176 709 E2d 782, cerf. denied, 464 U.S. 844 (1983).
177 On remand, the jury found for plaintiff, but the same district judge set aside the
verdict leading to the second appeal. Again, the Court of Appeals reversed, this time
holding that there was sufficient evidence "of deliberate indifference respecting one
very significant aspect of her welfare, the protection from abuse" to sustain the verdict.
Id. at 790-92.
172
173
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[those that] exist in the foster care context, particularly in respect of [sic] the relationship between agency personnel and the
foster parent."17sIn addition, the court asserted that information
is not as easily gained about the treatment of foster care children
as it can be in other settings since there are only "occasional
l ~ ~ the
visits" to foster homes by agency social ~ 0 r k e r s . Finally,
court attached significance to the relationship between foster
parents and foster care agencies which the court felt was less
"unequivocally hierarchical than is the case with prison guards
and a warden."lsO
Despite these supposed differences, the Doe I court applied
the deliberate indifference standard adopted by the Supreme
Court for eighth amendment prison claims. The court apparently
did not feel the need to articulate a standard that would accord
foster children greater protection than prisoners. Indeed, the
weight of the court's logic cuts in the opposite direction.
A curious kind of constitutional vacuum, therefore, seems
to exist with respect to foster children. Aside from a single and
largely unexplained damage award, and a solitary consent decree, foster children remain the sole identifiable group held in
the grip of the state still not accorded the benefits of the fundamental constitutional protection of safety.lsl Several factors
may account for this strange state of affairs.
First, as even the Doe court suggested, foster care is seen
as a particularly benevolent service run by the state with the
best of intentions.lS2 Prisons, jails, mental institutions, and
homes for the retarded have long been regarded as dumping
grounds for persons who are despised by society.lS3It is relatively easy for the judicial mind, once freed from the shackles
of the hands-off doctrine, to imagine abuses taking place in these
Doe I, 649 E2d at 142.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 119, 121-24, 164 and accompanying text.
Is2 The Doe court observed that where the child is placed in a foster home, there
is a tendency "to respect the foster family's autonomy and integrity [and to] . . .
minimize intrusiveness, given its goals of approximating a normal family environment
for foster children." 649 F.2d at 142.
lg3 See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1299
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (quoting W. Wolfensberger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional
Models 3 (1975)) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd
on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1980).
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dark places; the same is not true for foster care. When children
are taken from their parents out of an expressed concern for
their welfare, and, following removal, are placed in a seemingly
normal home for care by civilians who have volunteered for the
job, one is not automatically concerned. The supervision of the
placement is done not by wardens or jailers, but by social workers, the very epitome of a helping profession.lS4 It is hard to
grasp the idea that here, too, abuses can occur, and that when
they do they are largely unchecked by the state.
Second, flowing from the idea that only good intentions are
at work in the foster care field, is the corollary notion that
decisions with regard to foster care require a type of decisionmaking skill which is not appropriately the subject of judicial
review. After all, the job of a foster care agency involves nothing
less than child rearing, a discipline whose coinplexity has generated scores of theories and occupied the attention of numerous
scholars. It may have been this thought that motivated the
Supreme Court in a case involving the due process rights of a
foster child and a foster parent to remain together, to declare
that foster care administration involves "issues of unusual delicacy . . .where professional judgments regarding desirable procedures are constantly and rapidly changing."lS5
Even in Doe, these factors surfaced and influenced the
court's decision. The court stated that given the goal of establishing a normal home for the child the court should "minimize
intrusiveness" into the foster family.lg6The Ninth Circuit exercised a similar caution when it proclaimed a "need for flexibility
[in foster care] in order to accomplish what is best for [the]
Third, in addition to the courts' reluctance to entertain right
to safety cases, litigators do not seem to press claims to safety
in foster care with the same vigor that they exert in the prison

lu See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,322-23 (1971). H. Ginott, Between Parent
and Child 215-16 (1965).
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 855 (1977). There is a parallel between this reasoning and underlying concepts of
judicial and prosecutorial immunity, such as that expressed by the Court in Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
la Doe 1, 649 F.2d at 142.
Gibson, 799 E2d at 589.
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and mental health fields. Their hesitancy may be accounted for
by the fact that there are fewer public interest lawyers working
in the foster care field than in the other fields where this issue
has been litigated,lss and the few that are in the field have
primarily chosen to concentrate on other pressing issues which
foster care administration raises, including questions of permanency planning and preventive services, often to the exclusion
of right-to-safety concerns. Success in a right-to-safety case will
not provide a permanent home for the children, only a safer
placement while they remain in temporary care.lS9Thus, both
the dearth of lawyers pursuing the issue and the reluctance of
the courts to entertain the claims have combined to create a
barrier between foster children and the constitutional promise
of safe custodial conditions. It is now necessary to consider
whether any principled reasons exist that might render the right
to safety inapplicable to foster children.

111. The Search for a Principled Basis for Withholding the
Right to Safety
There are three possible explanations for denying a constitutional right to safety to foster children while providing it to
other groups or persons cared for by the state. First, children
in foster family care are not institutionalized. Second, foster
children come into state care voluntarily. Finally, foster children
may be subject to the Supreme Court's ruling in Ingraham v.
Wright,lgowhich held that school children do not have an eighth
amendment right to be protected from physical harm by their
custodians. This section analyzes whether any of these proposed
differences between foster children and other groups provide a
In 1980, there were approximately 700 public interest lawyers working in 117
public interest law centers. Mnookin, In the Interest, supra note 8, at 45. Less than
seven percent of these lawyers concern themselves with children's issues, a number
smaller than a "medium-sized law firm in Denver, Colorado." Id. at 49.
lS9 See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text, and infra notes 200-201 and
accompanying text. Public interest lawyers in other fields are not always put to such a
hard choice. If public interest lawyers in the prisoners' rights field, for example, were
forced to choose between litigation that would lead to the release of some of their
clients because of invalid convictions or litigation to improve the living conditions of
all of their clients while they are in prison, there might never have been the extensive
case law on prison reform.
I9O

430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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principled basis for a determination that foster children are not
eligible for the constitutional protection of the right to safety,
and demonstrates that they do not.
A. Custody Without Institutionalization
Children in foster family care do not reside in large communal custodial settings like prisons or mental institution^.^^^
Moreover, because of their age, children in foster care would
be under the control of an adult whether or not they were placed
in foster care. In this sense, children in foster care differ from
institutionalized adults who, but for their confinement, would
be free to do what they wished and live where they pleased.
These factors were important to the Supreme Court in Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services,192which held that
a foster child was not in "custody" for purposes of the habeas
corpus jurisdiction of the federal court. The case arose when a
mother brought suit, on behalf of her three sons, to challenge
the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute under which the
state obtained custody of her children and terminated her parental rights.193Without reaching the merits, the Court held that
habeas corpus did not lie because the children "are not prisoners
. . . [who] suffer any restrictions imposed by a state criminal
justice system."194Justice Powell for the majority stated that
foster children:
191 See slrpra note 6 and accompanying text.
192458 U.S. 502 (1981).
19J Ms. Lehman placed her three sons in the custody of the Lycoming County
Children's Services Agency, which placed them in foster homes. She visited her sons
monthly, but did not request their return for three years, at which time the Lycoming
County Children's Services Agency initiated parental termination proceedings. The
district court terminated her parental rights based on Ms. Lehman's "limited social and
intellectual development" and her "five-year separation from the children." Id. at 504.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the ruling. Id. at 505.
Ms. Lehman sought review in the United States Supreme Court by a writ of
certiorari rather than by appeal. Review was denied. Lehman v. Lycoming County
Children's Services, 439 U.S. 880 (1978). She then sought a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $12241, 2254 in the United States District Court of the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, requesting a declaration of invalidity of the Pennsylvania
statute under which her parental rights were terminated, a declaration that she was the
children's legal parent, and an order releasing the children into her custody. Id. at 50506. The district court dismissed the petition, without a hearing, on jurisdictional grounds.
This dismissal was affirmed by the Third Circuit, sitting en banc. Id. at 506.
Id. at 510.
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are in the "custody" of their foster parents in essentially the same way, and to the same extent, other
children are in the custody of their natural or adoptive
parents. Their situation in this respect differs little from
the situation of other children in the public generally;
they suffer no unusual restraints not imposed on other
children. 1g5
In Child v. Beame,lg6the district court made a similar observation in the course of dismissing a foster child's claim to a constitutional right to adoption. The court stated that:
the attempt to equate the child plaintiff's status while
in the foster care of the state with those who are taken
into custody under a civil commitment because of mental illness, physical retardation, incorrigibility or similar causes is somewhat farfetched. The civilly committed have been deprived of their liberty by the state
while the state's action in taking the child plaintiffs into
foster care, whether with an institution or foster parent,
is not a deprivation of liberty. The state has merely
provided a home in substitution for the one the parents
failed to provide.lg7
These cases, however, do not stand for the proposition that
foster children are insufficiently deprived of liberty to invoke
judicial review of the conditions of their care. First of all, neither
Lehman nor Child were challenges to the living conditions of
foster care. Instead, both courts were confronted with claims
that questioned the very presence of the children in foster
care.lg8In Child, the court made this distinction clear when it
noted that "plaintiffs do not question the living conditions in
Id. at 510.
412 F. Supp 593 (S.D.N.Y.1976).
197 Id. at 608.
lg8 In both Lehman and Child, the complaints were not related to the conditions of
the foster care placement, but to the fact or duration of placement, respectively. In
Lehman, the fact of placement in foster care was at issue since plaintiff's parental rights
were terminated upon her request to have her children released to her from foster care.
In Child, plaintiff children alleged a deliberate policy of keeping children in foster care
settings without seeking adoptive homes. 412 F. Supp. at 596.
195
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their foster homes."lg9 But in a right-to-safety case, the plaintiff
does not rely upon a liberty claim of restricted movement, as
was the case in both Lehman and Child. Rather, the claim
concerns the substantive due process liberty interest in being
held safely.200The key to the existence of a right to safety lies
in the recipient's dependence upon the state for the maintenance
of a safe living environment,201not in the recipient's assertion
that the state cannot restrict his liberty at all.
For example, prisoners cannot choose who they want to
provide needed medical care, what they will eat, or with whom
they will share their living quarters. These decisions, made by
their keepers, will, in large measure, determine the quality of
their lives. It is this dependence on the state for the very essentials of life, not the fact of institutionalization, that has prompted
the courts to recognize the entitlement to safety in the institutional context.202
Foster children, like prisoners, rely on the state for shelter,
clothing, food, and freedom from physical abuse or neglect.
Although they may not be held in large institutional settings,
they are just as dependent on the state for their needs as are
prisoners. This similarity is not diminished because the state
chooses to act through private agents in the foster care context.
Surely, if the state maintained a group home for children on
state property, providing two adults per child, it would be most
difficult to distinguish the children's situation from that of prisoners. In that circumstance, the state, having institutionalized
the children, would presumably be compelled to comply with
the constitutional requirements, including the right to safety,
applicable to institutionalized persons generally.203Regardless
of the locus of confinement, the sole purpose for the state's
intervention into the children's lives is protection.204Both the
Id. at 608.
See supra notes 145-148 and accompanying text.
m l Estelle v. Gamble. 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) ("An inmate must rely on prison
officials to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not
be met. In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical. . .torture. . . .
In less serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering.")
lo2See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Halderman v. Pennhurst
State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1973, aff'din part, rev'd in
part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1980).
m3 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 1 17-38a (West 1987) ("The public policy of
199
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rationale for foster care placement and the dependence on the
state emphasize the absurdity in excluding foster children from
the constitutional protection from harm merely because they are
not institutionalized in the traditional way.
Lehman's discussion of the liberty implications of foster
family placement is inapposite to a right-to-safety analysis for
another reason: Lehman dealt solely with a question of statutory, not constitutional, construction. There the issue for decision was whether a foster child's movement was sufficiently
restricted such that a federal habeas corpus petition would lie.
The Court held that, for purposes of habeas corpus, the children
were not in " c ~ s t o d y , "and
~ ~ ~that the mother, therefore, could
not seek a federal court order to obtain their release from care.
A right-to-safety case involves a different issue. In contrast to
a habeas corpus petition, which is calculated to review the
legality of custody, a right-to-safety case questions not the fact
of confinement, but the conditions of confinement.206Thus, Lehman is not authority for the proposition that foster children lack
a constitutional right to be protected, but only that the federal
habeas corpus statute is not the way to assert such a right.
B. Voluntary Placement and the Right to Safety

The overwhelming majority of foster care placements are
voluntary, meaning that the child's parents have consented to a

[the] state is: To protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely affected
through injury and neglect; to strengthen the family and to make the home safe for
children by enhancing parental capacity for good child care; to provide a temporary or
permanent nurturing and safe environment for children when necessary. . . ."); Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119 § 1 (West 1987); N.Y. Soc. Sew. Law § 395 (McKinney 1983)
(a public welfare district shall be responsible for the welfare of children residing or
found in its territory who are in need of public assistance, support and protection); Fla.
Stat. Ann. 8 409.145 (West 1986). See also supra note 17 and accompanying text. Courts
have expressed this purpose as well. See, e-g., Brooks v. Richardson, 478 F. Supp.
793,795-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
205 Lehman, 458 U.S. at 511.
206 In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Court confirmed that the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 8 1983, can be used to challenge the conditions of confinement.
Habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1966) is the appropriate device with which to challenge
the propriety of confinement.
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placement.207Consent to foster care occurs when physical or
mental illness, economic problems or other family crises make
it impossible for parents-particularly single mothers-to provide a stable home life for their children.208Often the consensual
placement follows a state-sponsored investigation into conditions of a deteriorating home caused by these pressures. Other
times, a parent may seek government help.209In either event,
the normal concomitant of foster care for most children is the
consent of their parents. In this sense, children enter foster care
in a manner that is quite different from the means by which
other groups normally enter state control. Prisoners, to take the
most obvious example, do not as a routine matter ask to be
imprisoned.210
The decision by the Supreme Court in Youngberg can be
understood as supporting the notion that the distinction between
voluntary and involuntary institutionalization is significant. In
no fewer than eleven places in the majority opinion, Justice
Powell stated that the due process right to safety which the
Court was recognizing for the first time applied to the involuntarily committed.211Given the emphasis by the Court on the
involuntary nature of the confinement, one must ask whether
the entitlement to safety in foster care should depend on, or be
207 See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's
Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 Geo. L.J. 887, 921-22 (1975) (as many as
50% voluntary placements); A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 138 (Studies from New York
and elsewhere estimate the percentage of voluntary placements between 50 and 90%.
In Massachusetts, 58.8% of the placements are voluntary); Mnookin, In Whose Best
Interest?, supra note 6, at 601; Musewicz, supra note 10, at 639; Information Services,
Characteristics of Children in Foster Care, New York City Reports, table 11 (1976).
Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 824 (1977).
209 A. Kadushin, supra note 6, at 316. Voluntary placement in foster care is usually
a two-part process. Initially parents and a local social service official enter a voluntary
placement agreement (VPA), which sets forth the terms and conditions of a child's care
and transfers the custody of the child from the parent to the authorized agency.
If a child will be in custody for more than 30 days, the social services official must
obtain judicial approval of the VPA. The judge must be shown that the parents voluntarily and knowingly entered the VPA, that they were unable to provide adequate care
at home, and that the child's best interests would be promoted by placement in foster
care. Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770,773 (2d Cir. 1983); Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S.
816, 824 n.9 (1977).
21° Even prisoners who voluntarily enter guilty pleas are not choosing to come
under state control. A guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently given is a defendant's
choice among several limited alternatives; it is a bargain with the prosecutor for what
is seen as the "least bad" option. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31-39 (1970).
2'1 457 U.S. at 310,312,313,314,315,316,318,321,322.
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influenced by, the voluntary nature of most foster care placem e n t ~ . For
~ ' ~ three reasons, it should not.
First, characterizing foster care placements as voluntary is
highly questionable; certainly they are not voluntary for the
person under care. The children themselves have no more
choice about placement than an involuntarily committed prisoner or mental patient. They are rarely asked whether they
desire to be in foster
and it is not clear that they should
be asked. It is impossible to believe that all but a small percentage of children would have the maturity and ability to make
an informed judgment.214No rational system would seek the
consent of a three-year-old, for example, as a condition of undertaking his care. As then-Chief Justice Burger put it: "[Mlost
children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make
sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their
need for medical care or treatment."215
Yet even the choice for the foster child's parent is largely
illusory as well. Many parents reluctantly agree to relinquish
custody temporarily in the face of a clear inability to care for
their child by themselves.216This is particularly true of impecunious parents, since, unlike the middle class who can arrange
for alternatives when family problems occur, "the poor have
212 Consent can sometimes make a difference. In Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770
(2d Cir. 1983), for example, the Second Circuit rejected a facial challenge to the loss of
parental control entailed in the New York State scheme for voluntary foster care
placement. The court relied in part upon the absence of evidence that consent was
coerced and in part on the idea that the state could constitutionally condition consent
to foster care on the diminution of parental rights. Id. at 777-82. But the court's ruling
was limited. It made plain that if, on remand, plaintiffs' allegations of a "Dickensian
portrait of the New York foster care system" were true, and if it was a system that
"greedily grasps control over every child placed within its domain," the result might be
diierent despite the presence of consent. Id. at 783. Joyner, therefore, does not support
the argument that consent to placement, in and of itself, eliminates the obligation of the
state to comply with the Constitution.
213 In his study, Gruber found that twenty-seven percent of the children voluntarily
placed in foster care were opposed to the decision. A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 141.
The lack of weight of the child's preference is reflected in most state statutes dealing
with foster care, where either the child's consent is not sought or is sought for limited
purposes only after he reaches a certain age (commonly 14). See, e.g., Minn. Stat.
§ 260.245; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 5 2151.353 (Baldwin 1987); N.J. Stat. Ann. 1 30:4c-11
(West 1981); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, § 23 (West 1958).
214 One study found that almost half of all foster children were too young to understand the reasons that they were placed in foster care. A. Gruber, supra note 6, at 141.
215 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
2'6 See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
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little choice but to submit to state-supervised child care when
family crises strike."217Voluntariness of placement is illusory
for another reason: the state social worker who investigated the
home may have threatened the parent with the permanent loss
of the child unless there was "consent" to temporary placement.218Whereas punitive and coercive techniques are usually
expressly prohibited, pressure is often seen by the caseworker
as legitimate. Thus the area between free choice and unacceptable coercion often is unclear.219
It is a small wonder that most parents in this predicament
opt for voluntary placement. They must either consent to the
placement, retaining some chance of having the child returned
later, or refuse consent and face the prospect of defending a
state-sponsored child protection proceeding in the local family
court, which, if they lose, significantly diminishes the possibility
of retaining parental rights.220Even in those cases where the
consent is genuine, it cannot reasonably be understood to be a
voluntary decision to expose a child to unsafe conditions.221
Indeed, such a decision would constitute child abuse as that
term is defined in most state
Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 834. See also Association for Retarded Citizens
v, Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 484 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
m8 Mnookin, In Whose Best Interest?, supra note 6,at 601.
Levine, Caveat Parens: A Demystifcation of the Child Protection System, 35
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1973). See also Musewicz, supra note 10, at 639 (such parents
are "frequently uneducated and without legal advice except for that offered by the social
worker encouraging the placement").
"O Mnookin, In Wltose Best Interest?, supra note 6, at 601. See also Children's
Defense Fund, supra note 7, at 18; Levine, supra note 219, at 23-24.
"I The government may not condition the receipt of these, or any, benefits on the
non-assertion of a constitutional right even if the benefits are considered a "mere
privilege." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 510 (1978). But see Town of Newton
v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. 1187 (1987), where the Court held lawful a knowing and intelligent
waiver of the right to file a civil rights complaint in exchange for dismissal of criminal
charges.
"2 Such treatment would, for example, constitute neglect under New Jersey law:
"Neglect of a child shall consist in any of the following acts, by anyone having the
custody or control of the child: . . .failure to do or permit to be done any act necessary
for the child's physical or moral well-being." N.J. Stat. Ann. 8 9 6 1 (West 1976). See
also, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119 8 1 (West 1958); Corn. Gen. Stat. § 17-38a
(West 1975). Federal standards also suggest that exposure to unsafe conditions constitutes abuse or neglect. Placing a child in such conditions, for example, falls within the.
definition of child abuse and neglect given in the Chid Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act: "[Clhild abuse and neglect means the physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or
exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a child under the age of eighteen
by a person who is responsible for the child's welfare under circumstances which

...

Heinonline - - 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 240 1988

19881

Constitutional Protection of Foster Children

24 1

The second reason that the constitutional right to safety
should not depend upon the voluntariness of the placement is
that the right, as even the Youngberg Court appears to have
recognized, is too basic to depend upon that factor alone. The
Supreme Court's reasoning in Youngberg itself, notwithstanding
its repeated use of the term "involuntarily committed," suggests
that the right to safety encompasses the voluntarily as well as
the involuntarily confined. Relying on precedent, the Court
stated: "If it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted
criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to
confine the involuntarily committed-who may not be punished
at all-in unsafe conditions."223"An individual's liberty is no
less worthy of protection merely because he has consented to
be placed in a situation of confinement."224If a person lost all
claim to constitutional protection because he consented to confinement, "the state arguably could chain confined residents to
their beds and administer wanton physical beatings without violating the constitution. This . . . represents a complete abdication of the state's constitutional duty to respect the rights of
all its citizens to fundamental liberty."225
Third, the right to safety must apply to voluntary admissions because of the established constitutional principle that a
state must administer constitutionally even those services which
it only provides voluntarily.226Similar treatment by the Supreme
indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby. . . ." 42
U.S.C. 8 5102 (1982). This act and other federal child protection acts are discussed in
D. Besharov, The Abused and Neglected Child: Multi-Disciplinary Court Practice 1133 (1978).
457 U.S. at 315-16. Furthermore, "[among] the historic liberties so protected
was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on
personal security." Zngraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 673. See also Association for
Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473,485 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd713 F.2d 1384
(8th Cu. 1983).
If Justice Powell really meant to limit the right to safety to the involuntarily
confined, he picked a strange case in which to do it. Romeo was committed by court
order on petition of his mother, his sole caretaker, who stated that she could no longer
care for him. Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence, was not wrong when he said
that "the state did not seek custody of respondent; the family understandably sought
the state's aid to meet a serious need." 457 U.S. at 329.
224 Association for Retarded Citizens, 561 E Supp. at 485.
zz Id. See also Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d
1239, 1245 (2d Cir. 1984).
226 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). This principle has been
relied upon in several cases dealing with voluntary and involuntary confinement. See,
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Court of the state provision of education illustrates this principle. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no
right to compel a state to establish a system of free education
~7
the Court has also held that once it
for its ~ i t i z e n s . ~However,
elects to provide such a system, it must administer that system
in conformity with constitutional commands.228Similarly, although there is no recognized affirmative constitutional right to
the provision of foster care,229the state, having chosen to provide the service, is obligated to administer it ~onstitutionally.~30
In short, since most children cannot consent to foster care,
since few parents truly consent to foster care, since none consent to unsafe care for their children, since safety is too important to be bartered or dependent on the voluntary nature of the
service, and since the provision of a service by the state must
be administered constitutionally, the constitutional right to
safety must follow all children into care regardless of whether
or not their placement is voluntary.
C. Ingraham v. Wright and the Constitutional Right to Safety

Zngraham v. Wright231held that the eighth amendment does
not protect school children from excessive corporal punishment.232The Court also held that children may be physically
punished by their teachers without a prior due process hearing.233Taken together, these holdings might suggest that foster
children also lack constitutional protection from physical abuse,
e.g., Yo~rtigberg,457 U.S. at 315-16; Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v.
Cuomo, 737 F.2d at 1245-46.
"'Sari Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973), and
cases cited therein.
usGoss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
~9 See Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593,602 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
See Society for Good Will to Retarded Citizens v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1246
(2d Cir. 1984). Indeed, most state foster care laws do not even discuss distinctions
between voluntary and involuntary placement when dealing with the level of care to
which the foster child is entitled. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. Sew. Law $5 358a, 372a, 372c
(Consol. 1978); Minn. Stat. Ann. $ 257.071 (West 1982); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 8 3107.02
(Baldwin 1987): N.J. Stat. Ann. 130.4C (West 1981); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119.
5 23 (West 1969).
430 U.S. 651 (1977) (In as-4 decision, Justice White--joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens-filed a sham dissent in which they decried the maiority
- - opinion).
a' Id. at 662-71.
Id. at 672-82.
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but such a result is not compelled by either the reasoning or
result of Ingraham.
Ingraham does not foreclose right-to-safety cases for foster
children because the rationale the Court used for holding that
school children do not require constitutional protection from
physical abuse does not apply to foster care. Ingraham placed
great emphasis on the openness of the public schools and the
watchfulness of school children's parents. Schools, the Court
also pointed out, are not closed, twenty-four-hour-a-day instit u t i o n ~These
. ~ ~ ~factors, which the court found make mistreatment of school children unlikely, were contrasted with the case
of prisons, where the eighth amendment does apply. Judicial
scrutiny of penal conditions engendered by eighth amendment
commands is important precisely because prisons are institutions not usually open to public view, and because, as a group,
prison inmates are powerless and friendless.235
For purposes of constitutional protection and judicial intervention, foster children have more of the attributes of prisoners
than of school children. Like prison, and unlike school, foster
'care is a total institutional setting. No school bell rings for foster
children each day releasing them from care. Foster children,
unlike school children, cannot rely on the watchful eyes of their
parents to protect them from abuse; they are in foster care
precisely because their parents cannot care for them.236
The Court in Ingraham also held that procedural due process protection is not required before corporal punishment may
rw Id. at 670. In an interview with Bill Moyers broadcast the evening before his
resignation from the Supreme Court, Justice Powell, the author of the majority opinion,
offered this additional insight into the Court's reasoning:

I knew from my own experience in public education that the public schools
are quite public in the sense that PTA's-Parent Teacher Associations-school
board meetings are open to the public and parents come and testify before the
school board. I've sat through some long evenings with parents complaining
about this or that, that if there were any abuse of this provision of the Florida
Statute (providing for corporal punishment) that pressure would immediately
or promptly be brought on the particular school to correct it. And I just thought
it was not a situation for the judicial system of our country to become involved
in.
The Search for the Constitution, Interview with Justice Lewis Powell (PBS broadcast,
June 25, 1987) (transcribed by author).
U SIngraham, 430 U.S. at 669.
See supra notes 6 , 8 , 17,87 and accompanying text.
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be inflicted because physical punishment of school children is
generally "unremarkable in physical severity."237Civil and criminal state remedies were more than adequate to control those
few instances in which excessive punishment of school children
did occur.238Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of foster
care. The same factors that render foster care more akin to a
prison or juvenile detention facility than a school also provide
an environment in which serious abuse goes unchecked and
may remain unknown to the outside world.u9
The Ingraham Court limited itself to plaintiff's eighth
amendment and procedural due process claims;240it expressly
stated that it had no occasion to decide whether "corporal punishment of a public school child may give rise to an independent
cause of action to vindicate substantive rights under the Due
Process Clause."241Since the Ingraham record did not disclose
widespread abuse, the issue was not before the Court. The
problem of foster family abuse, however, does raise this unresolved issue.242
IV. The Search for a Remedy for Violence in Foster Care
It is well-established that for every right there should be a
corresponding remedy.243It is particularly important to find an

U71trgralram,430 U.S. at 677.
Id. at 672-82.
U9 As suggested infra, state tort remedies in this field are not adequate. See infra
notes 245-73 and accompanying text.
a0For a comparison of procedural due process and substantive due process, see
getrerally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 324-25, 416-24 (2d
ed. 1983).
430 U.S. at 679 11.47. This distinction explains how the Court in Youngberg
could hold that the right to safety for the mentally retarded flows from the substantive
provision of the fourteenth, and not from the eighth, amendment. 457 U.S. at 314-15
& 11.16. The Court has similarly held that rights of pretrial detainees derive from the
due process clause, not the eighth, amendment. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468
U.S. 576 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
a*In a post-Itrgrakam decision, the Fourth Circuit held that school children have
a substantive due process right to be protected from corporal punishment that amounts
to "brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience."
Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). See also Doe "A" v. Special School
Dist. of St. Louis County, 637 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Brooks v. School Bd.
of Richmond, 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (E.D. Va. 1983).
243 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) flhe laws of the
United States furnish remedies for the violation of vested legal rights.).
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effective remedy for violence in foster care. .Without the basic
right to safety, the dignity of the foster child and his ability to
develop into a mature, functioning adult are diminished.244This
section canvasses the available remedies for foster care violence, and demonstrates that the structural injunction, not the
damage action, offers the only effective remedy for violence in
foster care.
A. The Unavailability of Damage Actions
Abused foster children are increasingly turning to state
damage actions for compensation for the injuries that they have
suffered. Some of these suits, which have survived pretrial disreveal a formidable array of state tort law barriers to
ultimate success. Foremost among these is the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity. In its purest form, the doctrine
bars a suit against a state agency providing a governmental
service.246Suits are permitted in the doctrine's more modern
version, but only if the plaintiff can show that the governmental
The
activity sued upon is ministerial rather than di~cretionary.~~~
theory of this distinction is that the state ought to be free to
carry on its wide-ranging activities unimpeded by the risk of
liability for decisions that involve its discretionary, policymaking functions.248
In jurisdictions that recognize the modern sovereign immunity doctrine, a key issue in a suit brought by an abused
foster child is whether or not an agency's actions involved
See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Maybeny v. Pryor, 134 Mich. App. 826,352 N.W.2d 322 (1984), rev'd,
422 Mich. 579, 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985) (summary judgment in favor of foster parents
reversed); Zink v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 496 So. 2d 996 (Fla.
App. 1986) (summary judgment in favor of the defendant reversed).
246 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See generally
W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 117, 5 131 at 1044.
247 See, e-g., Koepf v. County of York, 198 Neb. 67,251 N.W.2d 866 (1977). Despite
important variations, all states retain immunity from suits that result from discretionary
governmental activities. The variations are as follows: a few states retain total immunity
from suit; some still preclude suits by individuals in courts, but have created administrative agencies that have the authority to decide claims against the state; others have
consented judicially to suits in only a very limited class of cases. Most states, however,
allow suits for non-discretionary activities that cause injury. W. Prosser & W. Keeton,
supra note 117, 5 131, at 1044.
248 Id. at 1039.
244

245
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discretionary decisionmaking. If the court finds that they did,
sovereign immunity bars the suit regardless of the agency's
negligence. The courts that have examined the issue have split
on whether the conditions of foster care placement involve this
judicially protected discretion. Several jurisdictions have held
that there is no sovereign immunity,249because there is no discretion involved in the foster care supervision process. Others,
however, have applied sovereign immunity.250 These courts,
pointing to the "delicate and complex judgments" required of
foster care agencies,251and alluding to foster care as an altruistic
governmental
entitled to a high degree of judicial deference, have shielded agencies from "hindsight scrutiny by the
Even in jurisdictions that do not accord sovereign immunity
to foster care agencies, however, recovery is difficult. The
agency may escape liability by shifting its portion of the blame
for the injury to the foster parents.254Having done so, it is then
able to avoid responsibility for the injury under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, on the ground that foster parents are not
employees of the state.2s5 The policy reasons that one court
assigned for this result are revealing. That court held that the
legislature could not have intended that foster parents be regarded as state employees because: "A legal theory conferring
employee status on foster parents . . . would place an intolerable
burden on the state and might well diminish the beneficial effect
of the foster care program."256
See, e.g., Koepf v. County of York, 198 Neb. 67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977);
National Bank of South Dakota v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1982).
soBrown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316, 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986); Walker v. State,
104 Misc. 2d 221, 428 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1980); Pickett v. Washington County, 31 Or. App.
1263,572 P.2d 1070 (1977); Jiminez v. County of Santa Cruz, 42 Cal. App. 3d 407, 116
Cal. Rptr. 878 (1974).
Pickett v. Washington County, 31 Or. App. 1263, 1268, 572 P.2d 1070, 1074
(1977).
U 2Id. at 1268, 572 P.2d at 1074.
s
' Id.
s4 See, e.g., Blanca v. Nassau County, 103 A.D.2d 524,480 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1984),
a / f d sub nont. Blanca C. By Carmen M. v. Nassau County, 65 N.Y.2d 712,481 N.E.2d
545, 492 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1985); Parker v. St. Christopher's Home, 77 A.D.2d 921 (1980).
See, e.g., New Jersey Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State, 184 N.J.
Super. 348, 446 A.2d 189 (1982), rev'd, 195 N.J. Super. 4, 477 A.2d 826, cert. denied,
99 N.J. 188,491 A.2d 691 (1984); Kern v. Steele County, 322 N.W.2d 187 (Minn. 1982).
U s New Jersey Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State, 195 N.J. Super. 4, 16,
477 A.2d 826, 833 (1984).
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Even when sovereign immunity is not invoked, or blame is
shifted to foster parent negligence, the courts have resisted
finding negligent supervision by the agency. In Koepf v. County
of Y ~ r kfor
, ~example,
~~
the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed
a directed verdict in favor of a foster care agency. In that case,
a fourteen-month-old child had died from severe physical injuries inflicted by his foster parent. Four months prior to the
child's death, the agency had been told that the foster mother
was not emotionally stable and that she did not take good care
of the
Expert testimony also revealed that the foster
mother was on medication for "physiological depression and
mental confusion."259Finally, there was testimony that three
weeks before the child was killed, he appeared at a state court
hearing with bruise marks on his body.260Despite this substantial
evidence of agency negligence, the Nebraska Supreme Court
agreed that this was still not enough evidence to submit the case
to a jury.
Sovereign immunity, the unavailability of respondeat superior, and the courts' reluctance to find an agency negligent in
its supervisory capacity make the opportunity for recovery
against an agency slight. They do not preclude damage actions
against the foster parents themselves, or the individual caseworker assigned to the case. The chance of recovery, however,
is slim there as well.
In several jurisdictions, foster parents are immune from suit
for negligent supervision of their foster
on the theory
that foster parents stand in the place of permanent parents and
therefore are entitled to the same family immunity.262If this
"loco par en ti^"^^^ doctrine of parental immunity is applied, no
198 Neb. 67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977).
Id. at 76, 251 N.W.2d at 872.
259 Id.
Id.
Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316, 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986); Goller v. White, 20
Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
262 In re Diane P., 120 N.H. 791, 424 A.2d 178 (1980); Rutkauski v. Wasko, 286
A.D. 327,143 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1955); Hush v. Devilbiss Co., 77 Mich. App. 639,259 N.W.2d
170 (1977); Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 594 S.W.2d 853 (1980).
263 "LOCOparentis" refers to a person "who intentionally accepts the rights and
duties of natural parenthood with respect to a child not his own." In re Diane P., 120
N.H. 791,424 A.2d 178 (1980) (citing Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 E2d 683,686
(6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 850 (1947)). See generally 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent
and Child 177 (1987).
257
258
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judgment can be awarded for negligence against foster parents
for their failure to maintain a safe home. Even if the parental
immunity doctrine is not invoked, however, the chance of a
recovery remains slight. Foster parents, normally drawn from
the ranks of moderate-income families, are often judgment
proof,264and as they are not considered state employees, the
states do not indemnify them for judgments entered against
them.265
Suits under state law against individual, state-employed
caseworkers, while theoretically possible in states without sovereign immunity doctrines, also are not likely to succeed because state-employed caseworkers are generally judgmentproof.266Federal civil rights damage actions are unavailing as
well, because the Supreme Court has approved several imposing
eleventh
qualified immunity,268 and Monell

See Cathey v. Bernard, 467 So.2d 9, 10 (La. App. 1985).
New Jersey Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State, 184 N.J. Super. 348,
446 A.2d 189, rev'd, 195 N.J. Super. 4, 477 A.2d 826, cert. denied, 99 N.J. 188, 491
A.2d 691 (1984).
266 Note, A Damages Remedy for Abuses by Child Protection Workers, 90 Yale
L.J. 681, 695 (1981).
267 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (state immunity); Pennhurst State
School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (state immunity); Brandon v. Holt,
469 U.S. 464 (1985) (official immunity). For the latest version of the enormous controversy over the scope of the eleventh amendment, compare the majority decision written
by Justice Powell with Justice Brennan's dissent in Welch v. State Dep't of Highways,
107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987). For a sampling of the scholarly debate, see Shapiro, Wrong
lkrns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 61 (1984);
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the 11th Amendment: A Narrow Construction
of at1 Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction,
35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033 (1983); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign
Itnntrmity Doctrines (pts. 1 & 2), 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515 (1978), 126 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1203 (1978).
265 An individual action for damages against a state official may be defeated because
of a qualified immunity that shields the defendant from liability for good faith violations
of constitutional rights, except those that were clearly established at the time of the
conduct which forms the basis of the cause of action. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800 (1982). See also supra note 125 and accompanying text. Given the lack of development of the right to safety for foster children, it is possible that a damage claim would
fail on that ground, at least initially. Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985) (right-to-safety case against state officials for failure
to protect a child from known risk of harm by parent dismissed because right to
protection is not clearly established). See also Comment, Defining the Scope of the Due
Process Right to Protection: The Fourth Circuit Considers Child Abuse and Good Faith
Immrmity, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 940 (1985).
2M
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doctrine269barriers to recovery in actions that charge violations
of federal constitutional rights",O or "constitutional
Although there have been several recent ground-breaking
opinions that appear to raise the possibility of liability,272the
impediments to recovery remain formidable. The number of
money recoveries for foster care abuse is minuscule compared
to the extent of actual abuse, and in those few cases in which
judgments have been obtained, the amount of the judgment is
quite low. Research has uncovered only four cases in which
damages have been awarded on state-created tort actions for
foster care abuse. The judgments granted in these cases range
from a low of $4,500 for the death of a foster child to a high of
$46,000. The total amount obtained for all of these cases is a
paltry $85,500.273Even if the outlook for damage actions were
more promising, they have other serious drawbacks which make
them unattractive vehicles for reform of the foster care sysThe next subsection explains why damage actions, even
if theoretically obtainable, are not a promising avenue of reform.
269 In a constitutional tort action a municipality is not liable for acts of its employees
unless the actions were pursuant to a deliberate municipal policy. Monell v. Dep't of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This is not to say that recovery is impossible, as
the Doe case discussed earlier shows. See supra notes 173, 175-77 and accompanying
text.
For a discussion of the various barriers to recovery for constitutional tort actions,
see Spumer, Federal Constitutional Rights: Priceless or Worthless? Awards or Money
Damages Under Section 1983,20 Tulsa L.J. 1,26 (1984).
n1"Constitutional torts" is the term used by Professor Christina Whitman to describe such damage actions. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 5, 7
(1980).
Several courts have rejected the doctrine of sovereign immunity and have allowed suits against states, counties, placement agencies or social workers to proceed.
See supra note 249. Other courts have held that suits were not barred by parental
immunity, since the foster parents were not considered to have loco parentis status.
Andrews v. Ostego County, 112 Misc. 2d 37, 446 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1982); Mayberry v.
Pryor, 422 Mich. 579,374 N.W.2d 683 (1985).
n3Vonner v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973) (wrongful
death, $4,500); Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Serv., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983)
(wrongful death, damages of $20,000 plus funeral expenses and costs); Cathey v. Bernard, 467 So. 2d 9 (La. App. 1985) (wrongful death and survival action, total of $15,000
awarded); Jenks v. State, 507 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 1987) (case settled for $46,000). A
review of reported tort damage awards contained in National Jury Verdict Review and
Analysis failed to disclose any unofficially reported judgments. Even when the Doe
case-the only other known award-is added, the total recovery from the American
legal system for the extensive amount of abuse and neglect in foster care is only
$310,500.
n4 For a less pessimistic view of the case law, see Comment, supra note 10, at
979-84.
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B. The Inadequacy of Damage Actions
Individual damage actions, even if available, are not useful
mechanisms for obtaining reform. They tend to focus attention,
myopically, on individual culpability for past actions instead of
on detection and correction of institutional deficiencies that contribute to the maltreatment of foster children. By its nature, a
claim for damages examines past wrongs. It seeks to compensate for an injury which has already occurred.275By contrast,
an equitable action for an injunction seeks to prevent harm from
occurring in the first instance.276
Because an individual damage action is concerned with the
culpability of the assigned caseworker or foster parent for the
abuse suffered by the child, rather than with the system itself,
it is unlikely that a damage claim will bring attention to the root
causes of the problem. It thus diverts attention from the real
culprit in the drama: the state's failure to fund and maintain an
adequate foster care system.
With the real problem obscured, two contradictory and
unhelpful tendencies compete for attention. The first is to shift
blame for the danger to children onto overworked caseworkers
or poorly selected and ill-trained foster parents.277Such charges
are often unfair as these people often lack the support or environment to do an acceptable job. Furthermore, this shift of focus
diverts desperately needed funds from structural reform to individual payments that change nothing in the system.
Moreover, the fear of liability may influence qualified people who might otherwise be attracted to this form of public
service to seek other kinds of work. Those who do enter or
remain in the field may engage in what has been called "defensive social work,"278 a term referring to practices followed because of a desire to avoid liability rather than to advance the
interests of the ~ h i l d r e n . ~Workers
~9
in the system may find

275 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821 (B)(i) (1979); P. Schuck, Suing Governments 15 (1983).
276 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821 (B)(i) (1979); Rothstein v. Wyman, 467
F.2d 226,241 (2d Cir. 1972); P. Schuck, supra note 275, at 15-16.
2'7 See D. Besharov, The Vulnerable Social Worker 15,65, 133. Cf.Whitman, supra
note 271, at 60.
278 D. Besharov, supra note 277, at 138. Cf.Whitman, supra note 271, at 53.
279 See D. Besharov, supra note 277, at 136-38.
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themselves saddled with a conflict of interest: their understandable desire to avoid personal liability versus the best interests
of the children dependent on their services. This second tendency is even more dangerous than the first as it may lead
courts, reluctant to impose liability upon "vulnerable" caseworkers, foster parents, or agencies, to render decisions, such
as K~epf,~~O
that restrictively define the range of protections
Another form s f defensive soguaranteed to foster
cial work is immobilized decisionmaking. The whole system will
collapse if liability precludes responsible decisionmaking in
areas such as reporting and investigating suspected cases, the
adequacy of foster parents, and termination of parental rights.282
The final casualty of a regime focused solely on the question
of individual responsibility is the loss of public education that
attends a more broad-based examination of societal fault in the
foster care system.283For similar reasons, Professor Christine
Whitman recommended that for civil rights actions generally,
"the time has come to admit that equitable actions may be a
[more] preferable form of judicial redress" than damage actions
for the vindication of constitutional rights.284Thus, even if the
chances of obtaining damage awards were better, individual
damage actions, which operate only after the injury has occurred, are not useful mechanisms for obtaining the structural
reform of foster care systems that is needed to ensure the right
to safety in foster care. Examination of the structural injunction,
undertaken in the next section, demonstrates its superiority as
a form of relief in the foster care area.
~.

C . The Structural Injunction
,

~

"Structural" or "institutional injunctions"285grant broad,
detailed relief as a remedy to constitutional violations in the
Koepf v. County of York, 1 9 8 ~ e b67,
. 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977).
Cf.Whitman, supra note 271, at 41-47.
z8z Id. at 138.
28) D. Besharov, supra note 277, at 159.
284 Whitman, supra note 271, at 4748, But see Levine, Social Worker Malpractice:
A New Approach Toward Accountability in the Juvenile Justice System, 1 J. JUV.L.
101 (1977).
2ss See, e.g., Rudenstine, Institutional Injunctions, 4 Cardozo L. Rev. 611 (1983)
(using the term "institutional injunctions" to describe equitable orders entered in cases
involving state and mental institutions); Chayes, The Role of the Judgk in Public Law
280

Heinonline - - 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 251 1988

252

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 23

operation of government-run services. The structural injunction
focuses prospectively on changing organizational behavior.286
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,287and coming to
maturity in later school desegregation cases,288the structural
injunction has since been used by federal courts in a wide variety
of civil rights contexts.289
Structural injunctions have been the subject of substantial
j u d i ~ i a l ~and
9 ~ scholarly291comment, and remain highly contro-

Litigation, 89 Haw. L. Rev. 1281, 1281-84 (1976) (terming the cases "Public Law"
litigation); Robertson, supra note 119, at 146 (terming the relief ordered "Structural
Injunctions Directed at Inmate Violence"); Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
Haw. L. Rev. 1 (1979) (terming the litigation "Structural Reform" litigation); Diver, The
Jirdge as Political Po~verbroker:Superintending Structural CI~angein Public Institutiorts, 65 Va. L. Rev. 43,49 (1979) (terming the cases "Institutional Reform" litigation);
Note, Cotnplex Enforcentertt: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 Haw. L. Rev. 626
(1981) (distinguishing cases seeking "complex enforcement" through a detailed injunction to "transform a social institution" from "discrete adjudication," which involves
only an application of legal forms to particular instances of wrongdoing).
286 Robertson, supra note 119, at 146, and authorities cited therein.
287 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Brown has been frequently mentioned
as the progenitor of all modem structural injunction cases. See, e-g., Rudenstine,
Jlrdicially Ordered Social Reform, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 451 (1986); Rosenberg & Phillips,
Itutit~rtiottalizationof Conflict in the Reform of Schools: A Case Study of Court Zmpletttentatiort of tlte PARC Decree, 57 Ind. L.J. 425 (1982).
See P. Dimond, Beyond Busing: Inside the Challenge to Urban Segregation
(1985); Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 Yale L.J.
1700, 1709-12 (1986); Moss, Participation and Department of Justice School Desegregation Consent Decrees, 95 Yale L.J. 1811 (1986). Important desegregation cases of the
last decade include Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Columbus Bd. of Educ.
v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
289 See, e.g., Levy v. Urbach, 651 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1981) (institution for treatment
of persons suffering from leprosy); French v. Owens, 538 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. Ind. 1982)
(prisons); Rhem v. Malcolm, 432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part, 527 F.2d
1041 (2d Cir. 1975) (jails); Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977)
(juvenile detention facility); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 @. Minn. 1974) aff'd
itt part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977) (mental institution); New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (institution for the
mentally retarded); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F.
Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), adopted, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (special
education).
rw Compare, for example, the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions in
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). At the close of the October 1986 term, four
of the sitting justices generally opposed structural injunctions while four approved of
them. Justice Scalia has yet to address this topic as a justice of the Supreme Court.
Justice Powell's resignation will do nothing to lessen the controversy. For a discussion
of the clash of views among the current justices, see Rudenstine, supra note 285. Lower
federal judges have also addressed this topic. Lasker, Judicial Supervision of Institutiorla1 Refornt, 5 Crim. Just. Ethics 2, 79 (1986); Weinstein, The Effect of Austerity on
Ittstitirtional Litigation, 6 L. and Hum. Behav. 145 (1982); Johnson, Observation - The
Cortstitirtion and the Federal District Judge, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 903 (1976).
191 Among the major works favoring the use of structural injunctions are A. Neier,
sirpra note 14; Rudenstine, supra note 285; Eisenberg & Yazell, The Ordinary and the

Heinonline - - 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 252 1988

19881

Constitutional Protection of Foster Children

253

versial. Opponents contend that they violate the separation of
powers, erode federalism barriers, and compromise democratic
principles. Supporters counter, often with arguments drawn
from history, that the use of broad equitable federal injunctive
powers does not represent a radical departure from the traditional judicial role. But the criticism most often uttered in opposition to this form of relief is that "courts lack the expertise
and administrative capacity necessary to improve"292large bareaucratic governmental systems such as the foster care system.
No doubt there are serious impediments to effective implementation of a decree calling for safe treatment of foster children. Implementation may require substantial restructuring of a
large, bureaucratic institution. Reform will require piercing the
institutional veil, for unless the will to change is transmitted to
the caseworkers who select and supervise the foster homes, and
to the foster parents themselves, the right to safety will be a
chirneraazg3
Moreover, organizational and psychological change
alone will be insufficient. Safety will come only at a price.
Increased appropriations will be needed to hire and train more
and better-qualified caseworkers and foster parents and to provide support services for foster parents and children.294
The only remedy that holds significant promise of accomplishing this feat is a structural injunction. In contrast to the
limited possibilities for success with damage actions, the evidence suggests that structural injunctions do engender improvements. Of course, the benefits are not felt overnight; change is
often measured by "inches and centimeters" rather than "leaps

Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 Ham. L. Rev. 465 (1980); Fiss, supra note
285; Goldstein, A S~vannSong for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13
Ham. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1978). Works criticizing this form of relief include Horowitz,
Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983
Duke L.J. 1265; Diver, supra note 285; Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers,
35 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 949 (1978); Fmg, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U . Pa.
L. Rev. 715 (1978); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable
Remedies, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 661 (1978).
Comment. suora note 94. at 388.
293 See supra noies 277-78 and accompanying text. See also Lowry, supra note 7,
at
279.
-~
..
294 See also Zeigler, supra note 13, at 40-42 (review of the authority that holds that
inadequate resources cannot be used as an excuse to avoid compliance with constitutionally guaranteed rights).
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and bounds."295The cases involving prison violence exemplify
the successful use of structural injunctions.296
In a law review article, Professor James E. Robertson recently surveyed the results of four prison cases in which structural injunctions designed to reduce prison violence were obtained.297He found that with the passage of time and vigorous
efforts at implementation, the decrees "result[ed] in a significant
lessening of prison violence."298 Similar results have been obtained in the implementation of structural injunctions dealing
with other concerns. Prison systems in general have been reshaped,299and institutions for the mentally ill and the mentally
retarded have been drastically altered.300Moreover, the available evidence on cases that have addressed educational issues
indicates that compliance with judicially ordered reform is ob"5 Rebell, Implementation of Court Mandates Concerning Special Education: The
Problems arrd the Potential, 10 J.L. & Educ. 335,355 (1981). See also Note, The Wyatt
Case: Implementations of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 Yale
L.J. 1338; 1356 (1975).
A decree seeking to reduce ~ r i s o nviolence is. if anvthina, more difficult to
implement than one concerned with fister parent abuse and negiect. Prisons aretypically
populated with adults who have demonstrated a proclivity for extreme violence. Robertson, supra note 119, at 106. See also H. Toch, Police, Prisons and the Problems of
Violence, 53 (1977), cited in Robertson, supra note 119. The existence of an active and
violent prison subculture is well known and amply documented. Id. at 108-09 and
authorities cited therein. If significant results can be obtained in that inherently volatile
environment, then positive change should be possible in the more benign setting of
foster family care. Although it is true that the state has less control over the happenings
in a civilian foster home than in the highly regimented setting of a prison, there are
ample means available for the control of violence in foster care. See supra notes 53-65
and accompanying text. If these safeguards are followed, there is every reason to believe
that foster care mistreatment can be greatly minimized with less effort than would be
required to achieve safety in prisons.
Robertson, supra note 119, at 146-55.
D8 Id. at 154. See, e.g., Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14 (D.P.R.
1979).
Feliciarlo involved the Puerto Rico prison system. In 1981-82, there were 49 deaths and
75 serious injuries in the Puerto Rico prison system. By 1983-84, the numbers had
declined to one death and 17 serious injuries, one-seventh the rate prior to the judgment.
Robertson, supra note 119, at 153, citing a letter from Cirilo Castro Penaloza, Acting
Administrator, Administration de Correccion, Puerto Rico (Undated, postmarked Feb.
1985); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F.
Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.P.R. 1977),
remarrded, 599 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.), aff'd, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 839 (1980).
299 See generally M . Hanis & D. Spiller, After Decision: Implementation of Judicial
Decrees in Correctional Settings (1977).
See D. Rothman & S. Rothman, supra note 120 (successful implementation of
the Willowbrook remedial decree resulted in the community placement of half of the
facility's residents; it also brought about positive changes in the state's policy regarding
the care of retarded persons).

"

J*
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tainable.301In all these areas, the initial recalcitrance of defendants to obey the decree was overcome by patient, yet persistent, efforts b y courts and by -plaintiffs' attorneys.
Structural injunctions tend to bring benefits which are
broader than those strictly related to literal compliance with
court orders. The "focused compulsion"302engendered by a
structural law suit causes policy makers to attend to problems
that they would otherwise ignore.303Moreover, the cases t h m selves may "sensitize . . . the public . . . to the need for . . .
reform."3w By serving the traditional federal judicial role of the
community's "sensitive conscience,"30sthe courts have stimulated other branches of government to act responsively to the
needs highlighted by the decrees.306In the child welfare field,
this "informing function"307of institutional litigation would be
particularly valuable. Structural injunctions, despite the difficulty of enforcement, would "focus attention on the systemic
nature of problems plaguing child welfare."308
Even if the potential benefits of the structural injunction
were less clear, the case for granting structural injunctions
would~stillbe compelling. Given the lack of realistic alternatives,309it would be a default of constitutional responsibility for
~

301 M. Rebel1 & A. Block, Educational Policy Making and the Courts 65 (1982)
(compliance achieved in most of 41 randomly selected education decrees not involving
desegregation). The results of school desegregation decrees are less clear. Compare
United States Civil Rights Commission, Fulfilling the Letter and Spirit of the Law:
Desegregation of the Nation's Schools, Letter of Transmittal (1976) (communities in
which desegregation proceeds without major incident far outnumber those like Boston
and Louisville) with H. Kalodner & I. Fishman, Limits of Justice: The Court's Role in
School Desegregation (1978) (case studies of several school desegregation cases where
the level of compliance was minimal). The spotty results in school desegregation cases
may be explained by their high visibility and the tremendous amount of opposition they
receive.
Un Rebell, supra note 295, at 344 n.26.
M3 Johnson, The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 Ala. L.
Rev. 271,273-79 (1981).
UU Comment, supra note 94, at 392. See also Jacobs, The Prisoners' Rights Movement and Its Impacts: 1960-80, in N. Moms & M. Tonry, Crime and Justice: An Annual
Review of Research 459 (1981).
3a( Weinstein, supra note 290, at 151.
306 Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 Harv. L.
Rev. 428,463 (1977). Fpr an example of how this phenomenon has already occured in
foster care litigation, see infra note 388 and accompanying text.
A. Neier, supra note 14, at 237.
D. Besharov, supra note 277, at 159. See also Lowry supra note 7, at 275.
See supra notes 81-92.
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the courts not to attempt to enforcefoster children's crucial
constitutional right to safety. One commentator, who surveyed
the somewhat disappointing results of the federal courts' efforts
to achieve desegregation in our nation's schools, observed not
long ago that "[flor all the faults that have characterized adjudication, it is not possible to conceive of a constitutional system
in which no institution of government is prepared to declare and
enforce constitutional rights."310 Structural injunctions are
clearly the remedy of choice for the problem of violence in
foster care. The question arises as to the appropriate forum for
assertion of such claims. The next section addresses that
question.

V. The Search for a Forum
Both federal and state courts have jurisdiction to entertain
right-to-safety cases.311But, if a structural injunction is the preferable remedy to enforce the right to safety against foster care
violence, federal courts are the better forum in which to vindicate that right. Federal courts historically have been called upon
to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from encroachments by state officials. While state courts have in recent years
become more active participants in the dialogue of constitutional
adjudication,312 they lack the institutional attributes necessary
to overcome the bureaucratic and political obstacles to the
achievement of a safe foster care system. This section discusses
the superiority of federal courts as a forum for right-to-safety
cases and explains why two abstention doctrines that operate
to close federal courts to some claims-the domestic relations
exception and the Younger v. Harris doctrine-are not applicable to right-to-safety cases.
H. Kalodner & J. Fishman, supra note 301, at 23.
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (section 1983 actions may be brought
in the state courts). See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980); M.
Schwartz & J. Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses and Fees 15 (1986).
3'2 See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977); Collins, Looking to the States, Nat'l L.J., S-2 (Sept. 29,
1986). See,also Recent Developments in State Constitutional Law (P. Bamberger ed.
1985).
]I0

"1
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A. The Superiority of Federal Courts
Since the passage of the fourteenth amendment and the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, federal courts have been seen as the
"fundamental protectors of . . . federal rights."313The primary
basis for confidence in the federal courts in this role is the
protection provided by the Article I11 requirement of lifetime
appointment for federal judgese314This requ-bment largely insulates the federal judiciary from the political process, giving
federal judges the level of independence needed to counter the
majoritarian
tendencies-expressed
through
elected
official~~~~-to
tolerate a substandard system of foster care.
they
Since state judges often lack this electoral independen~e,~'~
are subject to political pressures that dilute their ability to order
and supervise reform of state institutions, such as the foster
care system.317Unlike a case where a single individual,israising
a,single constitutional issue, the judge in a foster care reform
case is asked to oversee the fundamental restructuring of a major
social. service system in order to guarantee an entire class essential constitutional rights.318
Staying power and independence are central to redressing
the injustices of foster care systems. The deficiencies in foster
care are not easily correctable; they arise in large part because
of bureaucratic inertia and a lack of commitment by elected
officials to the allocation of sufficient resources to provide the
services truly needed to protect the children in care. It is all too
easy for legislators to forget the needs of foster children when

313 M. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial-Power 1
(1980). See also Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522,541 (1983) (continued to recognize the
importance of a federal forum for the protection of federal rights); Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225 (1972) (reemphasized that federal courts play a crucial role in the protection
of federal rights); Whitman, supra note 271, at 24 n.114 (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 105 (1980). See also Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 107 S. Ct. 2802 (1987).
314 U.S. Const. art. 111, § 1 ("The judges . . . shall hold their offices during good
behavior."). See also Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Ham. L. Rev. 1105, 1127-28
(1977) (removal only by impeachment means maximum insulation from majority
pressures).
31Weuborne,supra note 314, at 1127-28.
316 Sfate judges are ordinarily elected for a fixed term. See generally Neuborne;
supra note 314, at 1122.
317 Neuborne, supra note 314, at 1127-28 and authorities cited therein.
318 See supra notes 302-08 and accompanying text.
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lobbyists press them for more popular services such as police,
fire protection and education.
There are other reasons why federal courts provide a superior forum to state courts for foster care right-to-safety cases.
First, state judges, as a group, are less likely to be as f a d i a r
with federal law as federaljudges are.319Most of the statejudge's
time is spent adjudicating claims that arise solely under a particular state's laws. In contrast, federal judges spend the bulk
of their time adjudicating federal claims. For this reason, federal
judges have much greater familiarity with federal constitutional
problems.320Second, federal judges tend to have what Professor
Neuborne terms a "psychological set"321that. disposes them. to
be more receptive to constitutional claims. They are "heirs of a
tradition of constitutional enforcement."322
Without the familiarity with federal law, support and time,
environment of receptivity, and the political independence that
characterize the federal judiciary, it is difficult to envision consistent, appropriate decisions in foster care right-to-safety cases.
This is not to say that statejudges are uniformly unable to handle
competently foster care reform cases. In fact, there are in-:
stances in which state judges have done so.323However, given
the added obstacles that they must overcome to achieve the
results required, foster care reform cases belong in federal
c o ~ r t . ~The
~ 4 following section examines whether either of two
3 1 Neuborne,
~
supra note 314, at 1121-24.
Iz0 M. Redish, supra note 313, at 2. Another

reason that the federal courts seem
better suited to address the right-to-safety cases is that the work load of state judges is
much greater than that of their federal colleagues. Neuborne, supra note 314, at 1122.
s2' Neuborne, supra note 314, at 1124.
JZ2 Id.
323 E.g., 111 re P., No. 78J04583 and No. 78J04584, slip. op. (Ky. 1983), cited in
Moraine, Making Foster Care Work, 4 Cal. Law. 24, 53 (1984); Palmer v. Cuomo, 121
A.D.2d 194,503 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1986).
It has been argued that there is empirical support for the notion of parity between
federal and state courts. Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and
State Corrrts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. 213
(1983). The data from that study, however, do not support the conclusion that state
courts are as competent to handle class action right-to-safety claims for structural
injunctive relief as are federal courts. The data were drawn from reported decisions
without apparent differentiation between individual and class claims, or between established and as-yet-unestablished rights. Id. at 238. Individual adjudications of established
rights differ from the class claims of previously unrecognized rights pertinent to the
problem of foster care abuse. In such uncharted waters, the sympathy, independence
and expertise of federal judges is especially important. Whitman, supra note 271, at 24
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major abstention doctrines would prevent the federal courts
from examining foster care reform cases.
B. Abstention Is Inappropriate in Right-to-Safety Cases

In Younger v. Harris,32Sthe Supreme Court gave new life
to an abstention doctrine applicable to civil rights cases.326The
Younger doctrine is an exception to the general duty of federal
courts to enforce federal law and "fearlessly
federal
constitutional rights from encroachment by state
Younger instructs district courts to refrain from adjudicating
properly presented federal constitutional issues when the relief
sought would result in halting a state criminal proceeding, unless
plaintiffs can demonstrate "extraordinary circumstance^."^^^ As
long as federal plaintiffs have an opportunity to present their
claim in the state criminal trial, and are not suffering irreparable
injury, then the federal court should abstain.330Justice Black
the
~ driving force behind
explained that "Our F e d e r a l i ~ m "is~ ~
n.114. In addition, the authors report that federal courts uphold federal claims in a
greater percentage of cases than do state courts. Solirnine & Walker, supra, at 240,
table 11 (federal courts uphold federal claims in 41% of cases, compared with 32% in
state courts). For the views of other commentators who favor the availability of federal
forums for vindication of federal rights, see Doernberg, There's No Reason for It; It's
Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 Hastings L.J. 597, 647-50 (1987); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157,168 (1953). For a contrary
view, see Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 605 (1981).
32s 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
326 The abstention doctrine now commonly associated with Younger traces its roots
back to In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888). See generally Zeigler, An Accommodation
of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional
Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U . Pa. L. Rev. 266,269-82 (1976) (tracing
the history of the nonintervention doctrine of Younger and arguing that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the doctrine diiers during periods of judicial activism and
judicial restraint).
3nParker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1980).
328 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,242 (1972) (The Court described federal courts
"as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional
action under color of state law."). See also Morial v. Judiciary Comm. of La., 565 F.2d
295,298-99 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
329 Younger, 401 U.S. at 53.
330 Id. at 43-45.
Id. at 44.
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the d0ctrine.33~The Supreme Court has steadily enlarged the
boundaries of this highly controversial doctrine by holding that
the underlying policies dictate restraining federal involvement
not only when state criminal proceedings are pending, but also
during civil proceedings in which the state is a party in its
"sovereign
Indeed, the doctrine creates an enclave of virtual immunity
from lower court enforcement of federal constitutional rights.
Federal courts have justified the application of the Younger
doctrine as necessary to prevent the unseemliness of allowing a
state court defendant to come "running into federal court seeking an adjudication of his rights andlor an injunction halting the
To permit federal jurisdiction in such
criminal pro~ecution."3~~
a case is considered undesireable because it would seem to
imply that the state judiciary is unable or unwilling to enforce
federal rights.335In addition, the bifurcation of the state case
'j2 Two other forms of abstention in use in federal courts today do not apply to
right-to-safety cases or would require expansion of existing doctrines to apply: Pullman
abstention and Burford abstention. See Railroad Comm'r of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Pullman only applies
when one case raises both a federal constitutional question and an unclear question of
state law, the resolution of which might modify the federal question or obviate the need
to decide it. A right-to-safety case generally raises only a federal issue. Moreover,
applying Pullmatt abstention would require waiting for the state court's decision on the
state issues hypothetically involved, decisions that could theoretically remain pending
during the child's entire time in foster care and permitting the harm to the foster child
to persist.
Similarly, Burford abstention, in which the federal court defers to the state court
to avoid interference with complex state administrative activities, usually by dismissing
the action, would be inapplicable in right-to-safety cases. The Burford doctrine had
been designed to apply to administrative actions, while right-to-safety cases deal with
judicial issues, 319 U.S. at 332. See generally C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts
5 52 (4th ed. 1983) (describing four variations of the abstention doctrine); Redish,
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L.J.
71 (1984).
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 432, 444 (1977). Over the years, the Supreme
Court has applied the doctrine to civil proceedings in which the state seeks civil
enforcement, id., proceedings regulating the conduct of attorneys, Middlesex County
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), proceedings dealing
with civil contempt, Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), proceedings concerning child
custody, Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) and, most recently, proceedings dealing
with posting bonds pending appeal in a purely private case, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987).
3" Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 3 (6th Cir. 1980).
See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (stressed that federal
court interference with a state's process is "an offense to the State's interest," and "can
readily be interpreted 'as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce
constitutional principles."'), reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975) (quoting Steffel v.
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that results when federal courts take jurisdiction of a case already in a state court threatens to throw the administration of
state criminal justice into confusion.336
The doctrine's boundaries were enlarged in Moore v.
S i r n ~ There
. ~ ~ ~a sharply divided Court applied the Younger
abstention doctrine to state child-protection proceedings. The
plaintiffs in Moore were suspected of abusing their children.
State officials had removed the children from school and placed
them involuntarily in foster care, without notice to the parents
and without a hearing pursuant to the Texas Family Code Act.
The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of several sections
of the
After several unsuccessful attempts to obtain a
hearing before the state courts, plaintiffs turned to federal court
and secured injunctive relief.339The Supreme Court, however,
found that the district court should have abstained, as the enjoined state court proceedings touched on matters which are "a
traditional area of state concern."340Because the state has a
vital interest in "quickly and effectively removing the victims
of child abuse from their parents,"341and because the child
protection proceedings, under state abuse and neglect laws, are
"in aid of and closely related to state criminal statutes,"342the
Court held that the Younger doctrine was applicable. Finding
none of the exceptions to the doctrine satisfied, the Court ordered abstention.343
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974). See also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)
(applying the Younger doctrine to halt the federal court's interference in the state
contempt process).
But see, e.g., Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Hams: Deference in Search of
a Rationale, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 463,482-84 (1978) (rejecting the need for deference to
avoid insulting state courts).
"Trainor, 431 U.S. at 446. See also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1979)
(noting that when federal courts intervene, they deprive the state judiciary of an opportunity to develop state policy); Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal
Courts, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 59 (1981).
337 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
338 Sections of chapters 11, 14, 15, 17, and 34 in Title 2 of the Texas Family Code
were challenged. See Note, Moore v. Sims: A Further Expansion of the Younger
Abstention Doctrine, 1 Pace L. Rev. 149 (1980).
339 Moore. 442 U.S. at 418-22.
340 ~ d at
. 435.
Id. (quoting Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1189 (S.D.
Tex. 197711.
BZ1d:'at 423, (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)).
343 Id. at 433-35.
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Although Moore v. Sims concerned an attempt by parents
to regain custody of their children, courts have since interpreted
the decision as requiring the application of the Younger principle
to all family court proceedings.344While one must therefore ask
whether the Younger doctrine applies or should apply to foster
child right-to-safety cases, an examination of the policies underlying the doctrine reveals that the answer is no. The Younger
doctrine developed as a response to special cases where the
state's interest in enforcement of its own laws outweighs the
strong federal interest in the federal court enforcement of federal
constitutional rights.345In right-to-safety cases, the important
constitutional rights at stake outweigh any possible interference
with the state's law enforcement interests. In such a context,
the balance tips against Younger abstention because the predicate for the doctrine's applicability is missing.
Federal prison reform cases provide an appropriate analogy. Cases concerning prison conditions have never been considered subject to the Younger doctrine,346primarily because
plaintiffs in these cases do not seek to overturn their convictions
or to shorten their incarceration. Thus, federal involvement in
these cases does not interfere with any pending state proceedings. The same is true of foster care right-to-safety cases, which
concern the quality, not the existence of the placement.
The analogy to prison cases, however, is not perfect. Unlike
prisoners, whose case is closed upon conviction, foster children
remain subject to judicial proceedings,347even if their parents
344 Id. at 425,430. District courts have based their opinions on a broad understanding
of Moore. See, e.g., Brown v. Jones, 473 F. Supp. 439,44346 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
334-35 (1977).
H6 In the few prison cases that have dealt with abstention issues, Younger abstention
has been rejected. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521,525 @.C. Cir. 1978) (abstention
did not prevent federal court from granting injunctive relief to pretrial detainees in case
of unconstitutional facility conditions); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 564-65 (10th
Cir, 1980) (prison conditions case where Pullman, Burford, and Younger abstention
were held to be inappropriate).
~4~Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94
Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (states must institute
a procedure whereby review of the child's placement occurs at least once every eighteen
months); Social Security Act § 47(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. ,§ 67(a)(l) (Supp. 1981) (the purpose
of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 is to expeditiously either
return the child to his parents, or to arrange for the child's adoption). See, e.g.. N.Y.
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have consented to placement. The child's case will generally
remain available for family court review during the time the
child is in foster care.348The difference between a foster care
case and a prison conditions case, then, is that a foster care
right-to-safety case touches on collateral areas that, at least
theoretically, are usually within the purview of cases already in
state courts.
The Supreme Court has sent contradictory messages
whether Younger applies to such collateral matters. On one
hand, in O'Shea v. little tor^,^^^ the Court approved application
of the abstention doctrine where the relief sought would broadly
affect state criminal court judicial practices and procedures.350
On the other hand, in Gerstein v. P ~ g h , 3 the
~ l Court refused to
apply Younger to an action seeking preliminary hearings for a
class of pre-trial detainees.352Lower courts attempting to distinguish Gerstein and O'Shea have reached seemingly irreconcilable results.353The agony of their efforts may explain what
Soc. Sew. Law 8 392 (Consol. 1984 & Supp. 1986) and infra note 348 and accompanying
text (a reviewing body may inquire into the child's foster care placement and order
improvement if needed).
"8 M. Hardin, Foster Children in the Courts 623 (1983). See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law
§ 392(10) (Consol. 1984 & Supp. 1986) (requires the court to possess continuing jurisdiction in the case of children who are continued in foster care; rehearings must occur
at least every twenty-four months). See also Miss. Code Ann. § 43-15-13 (Supp. 1986);
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 8 18 (Vernon 1986).
349 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
350 Id. at 500-01 (even though the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin any pending
criminal proceeding, the Court held that the relief sought-+ day-to-day audit of state
court practices-was within the Younger prohibition since it would have thrust the
federal court into the role of "receiver" of the state court system).
351 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
352 Id. at 108 n.9.
353 Lower federal courts have consistently found Younger applicable to collateral
challenges to the absence of a hearing or standards in state bail-setting procedures,
Muda v. Busse, 437 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ind. 1977); to the use of social histories prior
to adjudication in family court juvenile delinquency proceedings, J.P. v. DeSanti, 653
F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981); to the absence of appointed counsel in child support contempt
matters, Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980); and to failure to adjourn a criminal
trial on Friday, which the defendant observed as his sabbath, N.J. v. Chesmard, 555
F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1977). However, other courts have determined that Younger is not
implicated when the collateral attack is on preventive detention practices of family court
judges, Coleman v. Stanziam, 570 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1983), app. dismissed, 735
F.2d 118 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984), or concerns the right to bail
pending appeal of a criminal conviction, Abbott v. Laurie, 422 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I.
1976), or relates to the practice of indefinitely confining a juvenile pursuant to an unclear
family court order, A.T. v. County of Cook, 613 F. Supp. 775 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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prompted then-Justice Rehnquist to comment that the Court's
Younger-based decisions map a "sinuous path."3S4
The path is easier to follow in right-to-safety cases. In every
case in which a federal court has abstained from examining a
federal claim on Younger grounds because, as a collateral matter, the claim involved a family court case, the federal claim
involved an attack on the procedures followed by the state
c~urt.~~"t least for foster care cases, there is a relevant distinction between Gerstein and O'Shea. Gerstein was directed
not at state criminal prosecutions, but at the narrow legality of
pre-trial detention without a probable cause hearing.356O'Shea,
on the other hand, was a broad-based attack on the Cairo,
Illinois, criminaljustice system.357Since right-to-safety cases do
not challenge state court procedures, a foster care right-to-safety
case bears a greater similarity to Gerstein than to O'Shea, because it challenges only the legality of the conditions of foster
care, not the placement proceedings themselves.
When a federal court changes the procedures to be used in
a state proceeding by, for example, ordering the appointment of
it comes dangerously
counsel in a support order
close to intruding on the overriding state interest in conducting
its own judicial proceedings. Younger is designed, in part, to
avoid federal displacement of the state court "in supervising the
conduct of trials in state
This displacement can occur
when the federal challenge is to a collateral matter. The effect
of a federal injunction which alters a state procedure is to transfer control of the case from a judge in one system to a judge in
another system.360Such a transfer can create the same type of
confusion and inefficiency as would an injunction against the
state proceeding itself.

Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 459,479 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
See infra notes 363-64 and accompanying text.
JS6 420 U.S. at 108.
JJ7 414 U.S. at 499.
JJ8 Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1980).
359 N.J. v. Chesmard, 555 F.2d at 68 (3d Cir. 1977).
Jm See also J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1084 (6th Cir. 1981) (allowing federal
suits would "clearly interfere" with the procedures of the juvenile court system); Brown
v. Jones, 473 F. Supp. 439, 448 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (observing that without the Younger
application, a party would continually move to stop a procedure, never allowing an
action to get to court).
15'

JJJ
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Equitable relief in right-to-safety cases does not pose these
dangers. A federal court order to improve a foster care system
in no way interferes with the local family court process. It
neither dictates the procedures that the state court should follow
nor limits the range of disposition alternatives that the state
judge may consider. The overriding purpose of a family court
foster care proceeding is to determine whether or not foster care
placement is necessary, and, if it is, to determine when and by
what means it should be terminated.361That purpose is not
disturbed by a right-to-safety injunction. The state's interest in
the integrity of its own proceedings, therefore, is not compromised by federal injunctive relief protecting the safety of foster
children. Indeed, relief not only leaves intact the state interest
in protecting children, but also enhances it by improving the
quality of the foster care program.362
Lower federal courts confronting Younger issues in family
court and foster care matters have applied the doctrine in a
manner consistent with this analysis. Thus, cases seeking to
enjoin the use of certain family court procedures have been
dismissed,363but the courts have refused to apply Younger
where, as in a right-to-safety case, the plaintiff does not seek to
enjoin the state proceeding or to interfere with family court
proceedings.364

M. Hardin, supra note 348, at 86; Gattenberger, Foster Placement Review:
Problems and Opportunities, 83 Dick. L. Rev. 487, 491 (1979) (footnote omitted). See
also Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, 8 26 (Law Co-op Supp. 1987); N.Y. Soc. Sew.
Law 1392 (Consol. 1984); Ohio Rev. Code Ann, § 5103.151 (Baldwin 1984 & Supp.
1986); Va. Code Ann. 8 16.1-282 (1950 & Supp. 1987).
~2 62.H. V. Jamieson, 643 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1981). The mere existence of an
available, but unutilized, state forum has never been enough to authorize Younger
abstention. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal remedy for constitutional injury is
supplemental to the state remedy. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Blackrnun,
Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain
Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1985).
X3 See, e-g., L.H. v. Jamieson, 643 F.2d 1351 (9th Cu. 1981); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653
F.2d 1080 (6th Cu. 1981); Haag v. Cuyahoga County, 619 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ohio
1985); Brown v. Jones, 473 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
-See, e.g., L.H. v. Jamieson, 643 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1981); A.T. v. County of
Cook, 613 F. Supp. 775 (N.D. Ill. 1985). A.T. and L.H. are illustrative. In A.T., the
plaintiff sought release from the indefinite confinement that resulted when he was
confined pursuant to a family court order that allowed him to be "released upon request
of the child's parent or other responsible adult." 613 F. Supp. at 776. The court held
that Younger was not applicable because plaintiffs challenged what happened after the
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There are two additional reasons why Younger should not
relegate right-to-safety cases to the state courts. Younger does
not apply either when there is no adequate remedy in the state
court proceeding or when the plaintiff is suffering great and
immediate irreparable harm.365In the right-to-safety context,
both exceptions to Younger usually apply. First, a single family
court judge, in a single case, is unlikely to have either the
perspective or the authority to fashion relief that will improve
the quality of the foster care system. The only question normally
considered by the judge (and the only one that can be considered) is whether the child belongs in foster care, and, if so,
when and under what conditions release is appropriate.366This
yes-no, in-out approach is very different from what a right-tosafety decision requires. In such cases, a judge must consider
not simply the child's status, but also the quality of the child's
placement in the foster care system. Most state statutes provide
neither procedures nor remedial power for family court judges
to address these questions.367
Second, foster children do suffer great and immediate irreparable harm when their right to safety is violated. Unlike a
Younger situation, where the cost, anxiety and inconvenience
of having to defend against a criminal charge does not qualify
family court judge had ruled. The injunction requested, therefore, did not duplicate,
disrupt or insult the state judiciary. Id. at 778.
In L.H., the plaintiff class sought additional funding for private agencies that care
for children in the state's custody. The court refused to dismiss on Younger grounds
even though there were foster care review proceedings, in which plaintiffs could have
raised this claim, pending for all members of plaintiff class. The court noted that plaintiffs
were not seeking to enjoin those proceedings. It also found that the relief requested
"may enrich the variety of disposition alternatives available to a juvenile court judge."
643 F.2d at 1354.
M5 Younger, 401 U.S. at 45.
See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
367 Section 392 of New York's Social Service Law is an example of how little a
family court judge can do to improve safety for foster children during placement. Family
courts have four options: they can return the child to his parent, free the chid for
adoption, continue the existing foster care, or direct the adoption in the foster family
home itself. Application of Social Services Official, 89 A.D.2d 534, 452 N.Y.S.2d 612
(1982); Zti re L.,77 Misc. 2d 363, 353 N.Y.S.2d 317, modified on other grounds, 45
A.D.2d 375,357 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1974).Family courts are not given the task of overseeing
an agency's efforts and should avoid substituting theirjudgment for the commissioner's.
They should not choose between adequate plans or design their own plans, but should
merely satisfy themselves that the placement plans of the Commissioner are adequate.
It1 re Damon A., 61 N.Y.2d 77, 459 N.E.2d 1275, 471 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1983); In re
Commissioner of Social Services ex rel. Riddle v. Rapp, 127 Misc. 2d 835,487N.Y.S.2d

477 (1985).
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as a great and immediate irreparable harm, and unlike the possibility of having a child removed from parental custody during
the pendency of the action,36sviolations of the right to safety
cannot be rectified or minimized by subsequent review. When
safety is at stake, every moment counts. Loss of life itself may
be at stake--certainly, health and emotional well being are.369
With the potential damage so great, the Younger rationale for
delay is not persuasive.370
Younger, therefore, cannot bar a right-to-safety case in the
foster care field any more than it bars a right-to-safety case
involving prisoners. The policies that have led federal courts to
close their doors to a limited number of federal constitutional
cases are not contravened by right-to-safety cases. For the federal courts to abstain in such cases is for them to abdicate their
responsibility to enforce federal rights.
C. The Domestic Relations Exception is not a Jurisdictional
Barrier to Right-to-Safety Cases
"Poorly defined and unevenly applied,"371the domestic relations exception is a judge-made doctrine which permits federal
courts to decline to exercise diversity jurisdiction when to do
so might embroil them in family disputes. In its most extreme
expression of the concept, the Supreme Court described the
doctrine as impelled by the notion that "[tlhe whole subject of
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent andechild,
belong to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States."372
Several rationales have been offered for the doctrine, which
constitutes a major restriction of federal jurisdiction. It has been

xa Younger, 401 U.S. at 46; Moore, 442 U.S. at 434-35.

See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
Youngerjustified its abstention rule by, among other things, assuming that courts
of equity should not act in a restraining manner if the "moving party has an adequate
remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief." 401 U.S.
at 43-44. See also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 440-42 (1977) (resting on the
assumption that subsequent review and remedy at law can, except in the face of great
and immediate injury, satisfactorily ameliorate any h a m done to the moving party).
Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: To~varda Principled Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35 Hastings L.J.571, 573 (1984).
'7~In re B u m s , 136 U.S.586,593-94 (1890).
369

370
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said that the domestic relations exception is justified by the
strong state interest in family law matters, by the state courts'
superior competence in divorce and custody cases,373and by a
fear of the possibility of incompatible decrees in divorce and
child custody cases involving continuing judicial supervision.374
Some federal courts also have expressed discomfort at the prospect of becoming involved in these often acrimonious
proceedings.375
The doctrine is generally confined to diversity jurisdiction
cases where, absent the doctrine, a state law claim could be
brought in federal court solely because the parties reside in
different states. On occasion, however, federal courts have declined to adjudicate claims involving domestic disputes even
when they are otherwise properly brought under the federal
question jurisdiction of the federal courts.376A recent panel
opinion of the Eleventh Circuit suggested that the domestic
relations doctrine might apply in a right-to-safety case.377But
the doctrine, which has dubious credentials in any setting,378
has no place in right-to-safety cases.

J7J See, e.g., Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1968); Phillips, Nizer,
Benjamin, Krim and Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting C.
Wright, Federal Courts 84 (2d ed. 1970)).
374 See, e.g., Lloyd v. LoefRer, 694 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that
"the exercise of federal jurisdiction will create a potential for inconsistent decrees");
Sutter v. Pitts, 639 E2d 842, 844 (1st Cir. 1981) ("there is an obvious likelihood of
incompatible state and federal decrees").
See, e.g., Thrower v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C. 1976) ("vexatious"
field of family law warrants separate courts; "the federal court system should allow
[state courts] that dubious honor exclusively"); see also Wand, A Call for the Repudiation of the Domestic Relation Exception to Federal Jurisdiction, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 307,
385-87 (1975).
376 See, e.g., Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[tlhere is no
subject matter jurisdiction over these types of domestic disputes"); Zak v. Pilla, 698
F.2d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 1982) (even a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 should be
"dismissed by a federal district court for lack of jurisdiction"). But see Franks v. Smith,
717 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[tlhe mere fact that a claimed violation of constitutional rights arises in a domestic relations context does not bar review of those constitutional issues"). The Supreme Court has not expressly stated that the domestic relations
exception does not apply to cases brought under federal question jurisdiction. However,
the Court has not invoked this exception in cases challenging the constitutionality of a
child's placement or treatment in foster care. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415
(1979); Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
JnTaylor v. Ledbetter, 791 F.2d 881, 884 (11th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part on rehearing, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
378 See Atwood, supra note 371; Wand, supra note 375; Comment, Federal Jurisdiction and tile Domestic Relations Exception: A Search for Parameters, 31 UCLA L.
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After Erie Railroad v. Torz~pkins,~~~
a federal court's only
substantive concern in most diversity cases is to apply state law
in an even-handed manner.380In that limited context, the domestic relations exception, despite its questionable pedigree,
serves reasonably well. Without it, a potential out-of-state litigant in a state divorce or custody matter could escape adjudication of her dispute in the state tribunal to which it is assigned
by state law. For example, if litigants, in such an instance, can
avoid the state tribunal, the potential for disruption and inefficiency is greater than when a tort action is brought in federal
court. Unlike tort or contract matters, family law enforcement
is generally entrusted to a specialized trib~nal,3~l
and family law
cases often involve emotional matters of unique state concern.382
In domestic relations matters, the risk of inconsistent adjudications by judges untrained in the intricacies of local law--everpresent in all diversity jurisdiction cases-becomes too high a
price to pay for the theoretically impartial forum that diversity
jurisdiction is designed to obtain.
The balance, however, changes significantly when the litigation is brought to vindicate federal rights. No longer must the
court weigh the relative importance of an impartial federal forum
for the adjudication of a pure state law claim against the disruption to the state system caused by the provision of the alternaRev. 843 (1984); Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction: A
Re-Evaluation, 24 B.C.L. Rev. 661 (1983). Much of the criticism of the exception (which
originated from dicta in two Supreme Court opinions) questions whether the exception
is justified. Atwood, supra note 371, at 592-93; Wand, supra note 375, at 359-85; Note,
supra, at 684-91. Critics have also condemned the inconsistent application of the exception. Atwood, supra note 371, at 573; Wand, supra note 380, at 387; Comment,
supra, at 855-72; Note, supra, at 676-84.
Although authorities debate whether the exception should be redefined or abolished,
most agree that it should not extend to cases brought under federal question jurisdiction.
Wand, supra note 375, at 392; Comment, supra, at 882; Atwood, supra note 371, at
626. An extension of this sort would preclude federal courts from deciding important
constitutional issues that were intended to be within their jurisdiction. Wand, supra
note 375, at 392-93; Comment, supra, at 882-83.
379 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
mZd. at 71 (previously "the laws of the several States" under section 34 of the
Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789 did not include common law).
381 H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 284 (1968);
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d 348, 350 (1st Cir. 1974).
382 An example is the Baby " M case, involving surrogate parenting arrangements.
In re Baby " M , 217 N.J. Super. 313,525 A.2d 1128 (1987), cert. granted, 107 N.J. 140,
526 A.2d 203 (1987).
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tive forum. In right-to-safety cases, the clash is between the
overriding duty of federal courts to enforce and uphold constitutional rights, and the state's interest in having its courts hear
these cases. The addition of the federal constitutional component changes the result of the abstention inquiry.
Federal courts should be most sensitive to their institutional responsibility to accept jurisdiction assigned to
them by Congress when considering domestic relations
cases that raise substantial federal constitutional or
statutory claims. The domestic relations limitation, of
dubious validity even in diversity cases, is wholly inappropriate in.actions founded on a federal question.383
Accordingly, most courts and commentators take the position
that the domestic relations exception is appropriately restricted
to diversity cases.384
There is another reason why the doctrine should not apply
in right-to-safety cases on behalf of foster children: none of the
principles that the domestic relations exception is designed to
uphold are threatened by the invocation of federal jurisdiction.
The right to safety concerns the quality, not the fact or the
duration, of a child's placement in foster family care. The articulation and maintenance of this right by federal courts will not
interfere with divorce cases, intrude on competency regarding
family matters or have a major impact on child custody
arrangements.38S
Thus, since there are no genuine obstacles to the provision
of a federal forum for the vindication of a foster child's federally
secured constitutional right to safety, and since a structural
injunction granted by a federal court is the preferred remedy,
the concluding section of this article considers guidelines for
fashioning and administering the-appropriate injunctive relief if
foster care systems are to be made safe.
lS3

Atwood, supra note 371, at 625-26.
See supra note 378 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 361-62 and accompanying text.
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VI. Guidelines for Effective Structural Injunctions
Unfortunately, a precise recipe for success in obtaining
implementation of complex injunctive decrees does not
This is certainly true for foster care. There is only a single
federal structural injunction dealing with safety in foster care:
the order in G.L. v. Z ~ r n w a l t But
. ~ ~G.L.
~ is still in post-judgment litigation,388so courts and lawyers confronting foster care
right-to-safety cases do not have a completed record of other
cases in the foster care field to draw upon. However, there are
many mature structural injunctions in other, closely related,
fields that present similar implementation questions.389Important lessons emerge from the extensive experience in those cases
about what the court and the parties involved in the case must
do to increase the chances that a structural decree will be effective. This section discusses five guidelines derived from those
cases that, if followed, materially increase the probability of
successfully implementing a structural injunction that protects
the right to foster care safety while preserving the independence
and integrity of the court.
A. Continued Involvement of Plaintiffs' Counsel
Institutional judgments are not self-executing. Child welfare
agencies have been resistant to reform and, if the past is any
guide, there is no reason to think that merely hortatory court
386 Lowry,

supra note 7, at 280.
564 F. Supp. 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983). See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Under the terms of a supplemental consent decree, the court approved the
establishment of an outside body composed of three persons to assist the parties'
compliance with the decree. G.L.v. Zumwalt, Supplemental Consent Decree, at 2-7
(July 29,1985). The Committee, as that body is called, currently is engaged in monitoring
the decree. In addition, soon after the decree was entered, the state legislature passed
a law establishing a state children's commission which, among other things, was specifically charged with reporting to the legislature annually on compliance with the decree.
H.B. 256, 82nd Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess., 1973 Mo. Laws 504.
389 There is a growing literature, primarily in the form of case studies, on the effect
of structural injunctions. See, e.g., Alpert, Prison Reform by Judicial Decree: The
Unintended Consequences of Ruiz v. Estelle, 9 Just. Sys. J. 291 (1984); Champagne &
Hass, The Impact of Johnson v. Avery on Prison Administration, 43 Tenn. L. Rev. 275
(1976); M. Hams & D. Spiller, supra note 299; Mnookin, In the Interest, supra note 8;
Note, supra note 295; M. Rebel1 &A. Block, supra note 301; D. Rothman & S. Rothman,
supra note 120, at 66-89.
387
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orders will be treated more seriously than other calls for change
that are almost always ignored. An institutional injunction case,
therefore, cannot end at final judgment. Indeed, the victory that
accompanies attainment of an institutional injunction must be
seen by plaintiffs' counsel as only a way station on the road
toward the achievement of the clients' goal.
Several case studies of institutional reform litigation in
other areas stress the importance of an active role for the plaintiffs' counsel. David and Sheila Rothman in their study of the
Willowbrook litigation, for example, identify the constant involvement of plaintiffs' counsel, whose "energies did not flag"
over the decade or more of active post-judgment monitoring, as
having contributed in a major way to the successful implementation that was achieved in that case.390An American Bar Association study of compliance with court orders in prison reform
cases made a similar observation when it commented that "[ilt
is logical to conclude that compliance would not have occurred
as quickly or in the ways that it did if plaintiffs' attorneys [in
these cases] had not been monitoring actively."391Thus, the first
essential element to increase the probability of compliance with
a structural injunction is the continuing involvement of plaintiffs' attorney in the post-judgment proceedings.392

B. A SpeciJic Decree
The decree itself must be detailed and specific. It is not
enough to declare that the plaintiff foster children have the right
to be protected from harm; the court must specify what the
foster care system must do to effectuate the right. A concrete
decree focuses the parties and the court on the deficiencies in
the system that caused the problem. Decrees should be quantitative and precise and should provide specific tasks, possibly

3W
391

D. Rothman & S. Rothman, supra note 120, at 356-57.
M. Hanis & D. Spiller, supra note 299, at 396.

392 Where the administration of the decree is left to the parties, the burden of
reporting non-compliance usually falls on the plaintiff's attorney. Special Project, The
Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 784,824 (1978).
See also Note, supra note 295 at 1366, ("more active participation by the attorneys for
the plaintiffs and amici might have compensated for some of the deficiencies of the . . .
[monitor] that emerged during the implementation process").
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along with timetables for achieving them. If nonobjective standards and goals are provided, intermediate, objective standards
should also be outlined.393G.L. is a model of this type of
decree.394
The G.L. decree dealt with fifteen different aspects of the
problem, including caseworker case loads, foster parent compensation, medical and dental examinations, selection and supervision of foster homes, and investigations ~f suspected hstances of foster parent abuse and neglect. For each topic, the
decree provides standards for gauging the defendants' performance. For example, the defendants must maintain accurate
medical records for each child including, at minimum, a complete medical history, all medical, dental and eye examinations,
all inoculations and prescribed medication and indications as to
when the next exam should occur.39SThe decree does more than
simply declare that foster homes be supervised regularly by
trained caseworkers; it specifies a minimum acceptable frequency for the visits.3g6
While a court must avoid excessive detail that will enmesh
it in the minutiae of child care management,397it is important
that its order not be so general that it fails to provide effective
relief. A decree that prescribes specific standards for the defendants to meet saves the court and the parties from later timeconsuming and frustrating disputes about what constitutes compliance with the decree.398A court formulating a decree has the
opportunity to seek the input of the defendants. Since the decree
is normally not issued until well after the initial determination

-

393 Lottman, Enforcement of Judicial Decrees: Now Comes the Hard Part, 1 Mental
Disability L. Rep. 69,74 (1976); Note, supra note 306, at 457.
394 The district court in that case published the consent decree that it approved
because of the "assistance this case may render other courts considering similar questions." G.L. v. Zumwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030, 1030 (W.D. Mo. 1983). Publishing G.L.
was an unusual but not unprecedented event. See, e.g., Goldsby v. Carnes, 365 F.
Supp. 395,396 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
39s G.L., 564 F. Supp. at 1038.
396 G.L.,564 F. Supp. at 1034.
397 CCf.Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1973) ("problems of prisons
[are] not readily susceptible of resolution by decree"). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 531 (1978); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126
(1976).
3* Special Project, supra note 392, at 817-18 (addresses the advantages and disadvantages of a detailed decree).

.. .
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of liability, and since the defendants have the right to comment
on it without prejudicing their right to appeal, there is no impediment to seeking their assistance.399For the same reasons,
the defendants have an incentive to come forward. Used wisely,
the defendants' participation in the decree formulation process
can be beneficial. By incorporating defendants' suggestions the
court "encourages voluntarism" and "cooperative appro ache^."^^^ It also becomes more fully informed about the
practical consequences of its decree, and by encouraging the
defendants' participation, it helps blunt the criticism that the
judiciary lacks "relevant information"401needed to formulate
feasible remedies for systemic constitutional injuries.
An additional and important benefit of a detailed decree is
that it aids the court and parties in gauging the progress, or lack
thereof toward compliance. The American Bar Association's
study of prison cases revealed the practical significance of detailed structural decrees. The authors commented that the "clear
and unambiguous" nature of a decree contribute[s] to compliance in that it gives "the plaintiffs' attorneys objective standards
by which to measure failure to comply," and more importantly,
it "contribute[s] to the belief (by defendants) that the judge [is]
committed to achievement of compliance."402

C . The Need for Monitoring
In addition to its substantive provisions, the decree must
provide for monitoring the defendants' performance. Monitoring
399 See, e.g., Taylor v. Board of Educ., 288 F.2d 600,604 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 940 (1961).
For example, in Tatum v. Rogers, 75 Civ. 2782 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. February 20,
1979) (available August 20, 1987 on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file), an action challenging the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services maintenance and use
of its computerized criminal history information system, the court, after finding that the
plaintiff class's constitutional arguments were justified, directed the defendant agency
to prepare a feasibility study to advise the court and plaintiffs' counsel how the vast
defects in defendant's data base and procedures could be corrected.
Lasker, supra note 290, at 79. Judge Lasker, who has presided over several
significant structural decrees involving all the major pretrial detention facilities in New
York City, concludes that this approach avoids "unnecessary intrusion" by the judiciary.
Id. at 79.
"1 Robertson, supra note 119, at 148. See also Note, supra note 306, at 439 (participation by the defendants can "enhance the likelihood of compliance with whatever
standards are chosen").
M. Harris & D. Spiller, supra note 299, at 189.
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allows the court and the parties to determine the extent to which
defendants have implemented the decreea403Moreover, it forces
the defendants to confront their obligation to change the system
to comply with the decree. Unless defendants deliberately abdicate all responsibility, monitoring educates them about the
system that they are responsible for running.
There are several methods utilized by the courts to monitor
decrees. One is for the court merely to retain jurisdiction, leaving plaintiffs' counsel solely responsible for monitoring. This
method is generally coupled with provision for the plaintiffs'
counsel to have access to the institutional records, documents
and other relevant materials in the defendants' p o s s e ~ s i o n In
.~~
addition, most courts require the defendants to submit regular
.~~~
general
reports detailing the progress of i m p l e m e n t a t i ~ nThe
consensus is, however, that this alone is not an effective method
of i m p l e m e n t a t i ~ nAn
. ~ ~example
~
of the ineffectiveness of the
method is Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia.407In Mills, the court ordered the Board of Education to
provide suitable education for the handicapped. Over the next
three years, the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in obtaining complian~e.~O*
As a result, the court, on motion of the plaintiffs,
appointed a special master.409A special master may have a broad
range of power, including fact-finding, reporting and making
recommendations, negotiating disputes between the parties, acting as an arbitrator, and in some cases, issuing orders binding
the parties.410Although controversial, the use of masters in
Note, supra note 306, at 440; Special Project, supra note 392, at 824-37.
This device has been used frequently as an adjunct to the retention of jurisdiction.
See, e.g., G.L. v. Zumwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030, 1042 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Lottman, supra
note 393, at 69-70.
The drawback of this device is that it depends on the "accuracy or completeness
of information provided by administrators." Note, supra note 306, at 441. Reliability is
often suspect because defendants may exaggerate compliance or base the reports on
"inadequate record keeping systems." Id. at 442.
Note, supra note 306, at 441. This method typically leaves enforcement up to
an overworked plaintiffs' counsel whose lack of time and financial backing can hamper
the enforcement effort. Lottman, supra note 393, at 70.
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
Rebell, supra note 295, at 337-38.
* Id. at 338.
410 Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10 Toledo L.
Rev. 419, 421 (1979). Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956) (quoting ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920)). See
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institutional reform cases has been considered "highly effective"
by some commentator^.^^^
A third method of monitoring used by the courts, and one
somewhat less intrusive than a master, is the appointment of a
monitor. In contrast to the role of a master, a monitor's powers
are usually more limited. In a typical case the monitor serves
as the court's "'eyes and ears' during the implementation proce~s,"~
but
' ~ is not vested with direct responsibility for implem e n t a t i ~ n . In
~ ' ~Wyatt v. Stickney,414a case involving the rights
of the mentally ill and retarded in Alabama, Judge Frank Johnson used this device when he appointed a Human Rights Committee to oversee compliance. The committee was effective to
the extent that two years after the order there had been a
substantial improvement in safety, sanitation and habitability of
the facility,415but many other provisions of the order had not
been successfully addressed.416In the G.L. case, after attempts
at monitoring by the plaintiffs' counsel proved unsuccessful, the
court ordered the appointment of a blue ribbon commission with
powers similar to the Human Rights Committee used by Judge
J0hnson.~l7Thus, while there continues to be much debate about
which form of monitoring is most effective,418 and concrete
recommendations in this area cannot be made reliably, there
can be no debate that some method of examining defendants'
conduct after entry of the decree is crucial.
D. The Role of the District Judge
The district judge must be actively involved to ensure successful implementation of a structural injunction. By relying
getzerally Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 452
(1958).
4~ Nathan, supra note 410, at 421; Special Project, supra note 392, at 835.
Note, supra note 295, at 1360.
Id. at 1361.
414 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
4H Note, supra note 295, at 1378.
Id.
417 The Committee, a three-person body appointed by the parties, has been given a
budget with which to hire a professional staff person. G.L. v. Zumwalt, Supplemental
Consent Decree, at 2-7 (Filed July 29, 1985).
41S See, e.g., Nathan, supra note 410, at 461-64; Special Project, supra note 392,
at 809; Hams, Tlze Title VII Administrator, A Case Study in Judicial Flexibili~y,60
Cornell L. Rev. 53, 62-74 (1974).
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upon counsel, and, if appropriate, court-appointed monitoring
adjuncts, the court can avoid the appearance of administrative
involvement, which has been criticized by opponents of structural injunctions. Activity should not be confused with partisanship. The court need not shed the mantle of independence and
~ ~ to be
become identified as a partisan " p o ~ e r b r o k e r "in~ order
effectively involved. The judge sits to resolve disputes among
the parties in the post-judgment phase of litigation just as dispassionately and objectively as prior to judgment. The key to
success here is not that the judge identifies with one side or the
other--of course, she should not-but that the court not end its
involvement merely because a judgment has been entered.
A clearly communicated willingness of the court to use its
powers to enforce its decree is paramount. Without this, the
natural reluctance of defendants to comply is reinforced. Of all
the variables associated with institutional compliance with structural injunctions, this is the one that appears to be predictive.
A study of one of the major early prison condition cases,
involving the entire Arkansas prison system, Holt v. S a ~ e r , 4 ~ O
concluded that transcending all other factors that influenced
compliance was the "district court's expectation that defendants
would comply with all of the court's order."421By contrast, the
study of Hamilton v. S ~ h i r by
o ~the
~~
same research team identified the district judge's apparent satisfaction with the slow and
incomplete efforts of the defendants to achieve compliance as a
cause of the less than positive results achieved in that case.423
If, despite the result of the trial, the judge does not appear to
take the decree seriously, then neither will those responsible for
its im~lementation.~~~
419 The pejorative term "powerbroker" was first used in this context in Diver, supra
note 285.
420 309 F
. Supp. 363 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
M. Harris & D. Spiller, supra note 299, at 90. See also D. Rothman & S.
Rothman, supra note 120, at 356 (attributing successful implementation of the Willowbrook litigation in large part to the efforts of the district judge).
4U 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970).
423 M. Hams & D. Spiller, supra note 299, at 283. Failure of judicial involvement
has been affirmatively linked to poor compliance results by others. See, e.g., Mnookin,
In the Interest, supra note 8, at 351; Altman, Implementing a Civil Rights Injunction:
A Case Study of NAACP v. Brennan, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 739,750-51 (describing how
the "lack of judicial responsiveness" hindered enforcement of the decree).
424 M. Hanis & D. Spiller, supra note 299, at 27 (study concluded that the single
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E. The Need for Flexibility
Finally, the decree must be flexible enough so that unanticipated consequences can be dealt with through modification of
its terms if necessary. Any attempt, whether judicial, legislative
or executive, to reform an institution as complex as a modern
social services bureaucracy is likely to produce unintended cons e q u e n c e ~ . ~The
~ ' decree in G.L. v. Zumwalt, for example, limited the number of children permitted in any single foster home
to
because of concern that overcrowded foster homes
were more likely to become centers of maltreatment than foster
homes that were not overcrowded. While in the abstract this
in practice it produced difficulty.
provision seems
Several excellent foster homes were caring for more than
six G.L. class members when the decree was entered. In order
to comply with the literal language of the decree, defendants
would have had to remove children doing well in their homes.
The disruption and anxiety caused these children would have
outweighed any benefit that they might have gained from being
sent to smaller foster families. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a mechanism by which an injunction can be
In G.L. this
modified when it is not having its intended
was not necessary, as plaintiffs' counsel agreed to permit the

most important factor to a successful implementation effort was the judicial determination to see that compliance was obtained).
42-' Note, The Modifcation of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation,
99 Haw. L. Rev. 1020, 1033 (1986). A structural injunction, like any significant organizational change, often produces unintended results. Id. at 1034. See also Horowitz,
supra note 291, at 1305.
See also Wyatt v. Stickney. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (unintended consequences-boredom
and anxiety among the patients-resulted when, in order to comply with the decree,
the hospital was unable to allow the residents to work because it could not afford the
compensation).
426 G.L., 564 F. Supp. at 1036.
427 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
428 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) & (6); C. Wright, supra note 332, at 661. As early as
1932, Justice Cardozo stated that a "continuing decree of injunction directed to events
to come" should be understood to be "subject always to adaptation as events may shape
the need." United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932). See also United
States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953). Lower courts have continued to rely
on Cardozo's principles. See, e.g., Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 424 (4th Cir. 1981)
(en banc). See also Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modifcation of Injunctions
in tlte Federal Courts, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1101 (1986).
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children to remain in these homes providing that no others were
sent to them until they had shrunk, by attrition, to the required
size.429The court and parties need always be ready to modify
the decree to avoid detrimental, unintended consequences.430
These guidelines are, of course, general. They do not begin
to answer the many specific questions that any serious effort at
implementation of a right-to-safety decree will present.431They
do serve, however, to identify at least the major tasks that must
be attended to if implementation is to be achieved. If these tasks
are undertaken, given the record of effectiveness obtained for
structural decrees in other settings, there is reason to be hopeful
that a federal court can achieve its function of assuring that the
constitutional right to safety is provided to foster children.
Conclusion
The time has come to recognize that foster children have a
right to safety while in foster care. Foster care is intended to
be a temporary refuge for children whose parents cannot care
for them. But in practice, more often than has been acknowledged by many observers, foster care is not safe. Abuse and
neglect of foster children occur at levels that far exceed in
quantity and magnitude what a reasonably run system of care
should produce. State-countenanced mistreatment of innocent
children has serious ramifications for society. The infliction of
harm on children who have suffered the trauma of parental
default retards or even eliminates their potential for normal
development. However, the political process has proven to be
ineffective in alleviating this problem. Foster children, drawn
largely from the disadvantaged and from minority groups, sim-

429 See Letter from plaintiffs' counsel to defendants dated February 3, 1984, at 4
(on file with author).
430 Examples of court-ordered modifications of structural injunctions include New
York State Ass'n For Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975),
modification denied, 551 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'din part and rev'd in part,
706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983); Goldsby v. Carnes, 365
F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Mo. 1973), modified, 429 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Mo. 1977). For a
criticism of the over-eagerness of some courts to modii decrees when implementation
becomes difficult, see Shapiro, The Modification of Equitable Decrees: A Critical Commentary, 50 Brooklyn L. Rev. 459 (1984).
431 See supra notes 293-95 and accompanying text.
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ply do not have access or influence to move the executive or
legislative branches of government to increase the funding
needed to bring about change. As a practical matter, the courts
must become involved if foster care is to function as it is
intended.
The basis for judicial involvement is clear. The right to
safety has deep roots in American jurisprudential thought. During the past two decades, federal courts have developed and
implemented the right for every group of persons held under
state custody other than foster children. Ironically, foster children are the one group with the most to gain from recognition
of this fundamental right.
This article demonstrates that it is not possible to construct
a logical distinction between foster children and other groups
that have been afforded the benefits of the right to safety. To
make the right to safety effective, a court must be able to fashion
prospective relief with the flexibility to take into account the
wide range of factors that can stimulate the organizational
change needed. Experience with right-to-safety cases for other
groups shows that only the structural injunction provides the
court with these tools. Federal courts have historically served
as the forum for the protection of citizens' constitutional rights
from abridgement by the state. Therefore, they are the preferred
forum for foster care right-to-safety cases. Reform of foster care
will not come easily or quickly. But, if the guidelines offered in
this article for courts and parties are followed, experience from
other structural injunction cases demonstrates that federal
courts have it in their power to make foster care, at last, the
haven it was always intended to be.
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